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The eect of competition on nancial stability has been extensively discussed in the aca-
demic literature but the results are inconclusive. A strand of the literature supports the
idea that competition is detrimental for nancial stability, while other contributions sug-
gest that competition is benecial. So far, the focus of the analysis has been on the eect
that competition has on banks' risk-taking incentive. The existing literature considers risk
taking as the credit risk of the assets banks invest in. However, as the recent crisis has
shown, there is another important source of risk taking for nancial institutions linked to
the amount of liquidity they hold and the functioning of the interbank market. The rst
chapter analyzes the eect of competition on nancial stability. It shows that competition
is benecial for nancial stability as it induces banks to invest in more liquid portfolios
and thus, makes them less vulnerable to a liquidity shock. In a simple theoretical model
in which banks can trade assets on the interbank market to meet their stochastic liquidity
demand, the paper shows that, depending on the degree of credit market competition, two
equilibria can emerge. When competition in very intense, all banks keep enough liquid
asset (reserves) to face their demand for liquidity and default never occurs. When com-
petition is low, instead, banks make dierent initial portfolio choices. Some banks invest
mostly in the illiquid asset (loans to entrepreneurs) while others choose to hold a large
amount of the liquid asset. The former sell their loans to meet their liquidity demands,
when the liquidity shock materializes. In the state where their liquidity demand is low,
they sell part of their loans and make positive prots. In the other state where their liq-
uidity demand is high, they must sell all their loans and default. The existence of the
two equilibria described above depends on the degree of competition in the credit market.
1
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The intuition is that in order for banks not to default, they have to hold a large fraction
of their portfolios in reserves. This entails a cost in terms of foregone return on the loans.
Such a cost is larger as competition decreases, as granting loans becomes more protable
for banks. Thus holding a large amount of reserves and avoid default is optimal for banks
only when competition is intense. As competition decreases, it becomes optimal to reduce
reserves and invest more in loans and, thus, defaulting with positive probability.
The second chapter investigates another factor that might have contributed to the recent
nancial crisis aecting the ability of the banks to hedge again the liquidity shock. The
focus of the analysis in this chapter is on the functioning of interbank market. It shows
that incomplete information may induce banks not to participate in interbank market. In
a simple theoretical model of interconnected banks where they can borrow liquidity on the
interbank market to meet their liquidity needs, the analysis shows that interbank market
breakdown may emerge in equilibrium as consequence of the uncertainty on the counter-
party risk. In this case, banks in distress have to sell their asset to outside investors at
re sale prices. Mark-to-market accounting may, thus, turn a simple illiquidity problem
into a solvency issue and generate a wave of bankruptcies. Interbank market freeze and
contagion arise as consequence of the intertwining of incomplete information and mark-
to-market accounting. When the perceived risk of contagion is low, banks prefer not to
participate in the interbank market. This leads to re sales and, in some circumstances,
to systemic crisis. The results presented in the chapter are consistent with some features
of the recent nancial turmoil. During the crisis, the uncertainty of the counterparty risk
caused a prolonged malfunctioning of the interbank market as banks in distress were no
longer able to obtain the liquidity they needed. This triggered a downward spiral as the
fear of contagion and the interbank market frictions were reinforcing each other. Banks
were forced to sell assets at resale prices to meet their liquidity demand. The depressed
valuations propagated in the banking system through mark-to-market accounting, setting
the ground for contagion.
The third chapter analyzes the eects of a merger in two-sided markets. In two-sided




markets, two distinct groups of agents (sides) interact on one or more platforms. The main
feature of these markets is the existence of indirect network externalities. Consumers'
reservation value depends on the number of agents that patronize the same platform on
the other side of the market. The interest in these markets among practitioners and aca-
demics has grown in the last decade. Moreover, in the last few years, several mergers
between two-sided markets took places in dierent industries. The newspaper industry,
for example, has seen an increased concentration as consequence of several mergers, in
several countries. In the chapter, in a simple setting of horizontal dierentiation and price
competition, I analyze the eect of a merger on platforms' protability and consumers'
welfare. The main result of the paper is that, even without eciency gains, the merger
may be welfare enhancing. The existence of indirect network externalities induces merging
platforms to keep their price low at least on one side of the market. This in turn produces
a positive eect on consumers' welfare.
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Credit Market Competition and
Interbank Liquidity
Joint with Elena Carletti
2.1 Introduction
There is a long standing debate in the academic literature whether competition is benecial
or detrimental to nancial stability. The key issue is how competition aects banks' risk
taking behavior. One strand of the literature (see, e.g., Keeley, 1990, and subsequent
papers) argues that by reducing banks' prots, credit market competition reduces the
incentives for bank managers to behave prudently. On the opposite side, another strand
of the literature (e.g., Boyd and De Nicol o, 2005) argues that market power on the credit
market is detrimental for nancial stability. The idea is that a higher market power
increases borrowers' costs and thus their incentives to take risks. This in turn increases
the risk of banks' portfolios.
All this literature considers risk taking as the credit risk of the assets banks invest in.
However, as the recent crisis has shown, there is another important source of risk taking
for nancial institutions linked to the amount of liquidity they hold and the functioning
of the interbank market. This allows banks to reshue liquidity and meet their uncer-
tain liquidity demands. When liquidity is abundant on the market, the interbank market
works smoothly and liquidity risk does not represent a source of instability for nancial
5
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institutions. However, when liquidity is scarce on the market, nancial institutions may
be unable to cover their liquidity needs and go bankrupt. Crucial to the stability of the
nancial institutions is then the amount of total liquidity on the market as determined by
banks' initial portfolio allocations. Competition in the credit market aects such alloca-
tions as it determines the returns on the longer term investments and thus the opportunity
cost of holding liquidity.
So far there has not been research on the role of credit market competition on liquidity
provision in the interbank market. The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple
theoretical framework for analyzing how credit market competition aects banks' liquidity
risk in the interbank market. Our analysis is based on a standard banking model developed
in Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b, 2007) and Allen, Carletti and Gale (2009). As usual,
there are two periods. Banks raise deposits from risk averse consumers and can hold a
one-period liquid asset, that we dene as reserves, or grant a two-period risk free loan
to entrepreneurs with a return that depends on the degree of competition in the credit
market. Banks face aggregate uncertainty relative to their demand for liquidity at the
interim date as a stochastic fraction of their consumers want to consume early. To meet
their liquidity demands, banks can sell their loans on the interbank market at a price
that is endogenously determined by the amount of supply and demand of liquidity in the
market. The former is determined by the banks' initial choice of reserve holding, which
depends on the degree of competition in the credit market. The latter is determined by
realization of the liquidity shock and the promised repayments to consumers in the deposit
contract. In contrast to the models mentioned above, banks choose their initial portfolio
allocation and the deposit contract to maximize their expected prots and are monopolist
on the deposit market.
We show that two types of equilibria can emerge. In the rst, that we call no default
equilibrium, banks keep enough reserves to face their liquidity demands in all states. No
bank defaults, and since there is only aggregate uncertainty, there is no trade on the
interbank market. In the second equilibrium, which we dene mixed equilibrium, banks
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make dierent portfolio choices at the initial date. Some banks, that we call risky, choose
to invest all their deposits in loans and none in reserves. At the interim date, they sell
their loans to meet their liquidity demands. In the state where their liquidity demand is
low, they sell part of their loans and make positive prots. In the other state where their
liquidity demand is high, they must sell all their loans and default. The remaining banks,
that we call safe, choose to hold a large amount of reserves at the initial date to acquire
the loans sold by the risky banks on the interbank market at date 1. The existence of this
mixed equilibrium is due to the price volatility across the two states of the world. Since
the supply of liquidity at date 1 is xed and equal to the total initial investment of the safe
banks in reserves, prices must adjust in the two states to accommodate the uctuations
in the aggregate demand for liquidity. This clears the market at any date and state. The
price volatility depends on the degree of competition in the credit market, since the banks'
portfolio allocations as well as the promised deposit contract depend on it.
The main result of the paper is to show that the existence of the two equilibria described
above depends on the degree of competition in the credit market. When competition is
intense, only the no default equilibrium exists. As competition reduces, only the mixed
equilibrium exists. The intuition is that in order for banks not to default, they have to
hold a large fraction of their portfolios in reserves. This entails a cost in terms of foregone
return on the loans. Such a cost is larger as competition decreases, as granting loans
becomes more protable for banks. Thus holding a large amount of reserves and avoid
default is optimal for banks only when competition is intense. As competition decreases, it
becomes optimal to reduce reserves and invest more in loans. Some banks nd it optimal
then to become risky and default with positive probability. Although risky banks default
in the state when the aggregate liquidity demand is high, the loan rate is high enough to
ensure that they make enough prot in the other state. The result shows that the lack of
competition in the credit market is detrimental to nancial stability.
The paper is related to various others. A few studies (e.g., Matutes and Vives, 1996;
see also Carletti,2008, and Vives, 2010, for a survey) have analyzed the eect of deposit
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market competition on banks' vulnerability to runs. The results are inconclusive but tend
to suggest that a higher degree of competition in the deposit market makes banks more un-
stable. A number of papers have analyzed the functioning of the interbank market. Allen,
Carletti and Gale study the functioning of the interbank market when banks cannot hedge
against liquidity shocks. In contrast to our analyzes, they analyze only the case where
the no default equilibrium exists. Other papers analyze various market failures in the in-
terbank markets. For example, Heider, Hoerova (2009) focus on asymmetric information;
Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer (2008) on market power. By contrast, we consider com-
petitive interbank markets and focus on banks' inability to fully hedge against liquidity
shocks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sections 3 and 4
characterize the no default and the mixed equilibrium, respectively. Section 5 analyzes
the existence of the two equilibria. Section 6 discusses the implications of the model in
terms of welfare. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 The model
The model is based on Allen and Gale (2004b). Consider a three date (t = 0, 1, 2)
economy with three classes of agents: banks, entrepreneurs and investors. Banks act
as intermediaries between consumers and entrepreneurs. At date 0 they raise one unit of
funds from investors in exchange for a deposit contract and provide loans to entrepreneurs.
Consumers can deposit their funds at one bank only and entrepreneurs can obtain loans
from one bank only. Banks exercise monopoly power over consumers while they need
to compete to attract entrepreneurs. The idea is that banks operate in distinct regions.
Investors are locked in and can only deposit their funds at the bank in their region.
Entrepreneurs are instead mobile across regions.
There is a continuum of mass one of consumers in each region. Consumers have one
unit of endowment each at date 0 and nothing thereafter. They are all ex ante identical
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but can be of either early or late type at date 1. Early consumers value consumption only
at date 1 while late consumers value consumption only at date 2. Each consumer has a





L w. pr. 
H w. pr. (1   );
with H > L. As usual, we adopt the Law of Large Numbers so that  represents also
the fraction of early consumers at each bank.
The uncertainty about time preferences generates a preference for liquidity and a role
for banks as liquidity providers. Consumers deposit their funds in exchange for a demand
deposit contract that oers them c1 at date 1 and c2 at date 2 and have an ex ante expected
utility equal to
E[u(c1;c2;)] = E[u(c1) + (1   )u(c2)].
The utility function is twice dierentiable and satises all the usual neoclassical assump-
tions: u0(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0. Given that banks are assumed to be monopolists in the
deposit market, consumers deposit their funds at date 0 if they expect to have an utility
at least equal to the one they would obtain from storing their endowment.
Each bank invests a fraction Ri of the funds raised from consumers in reserves and a
fraction Li in loans to entrepreneurs. Reserves are a storage technology: one unit invested
at date t produces one unit at date t+1. Lending to entrepreneurs is a longer investment:
one unit lent in date 0 gives a return ri to the bank at date 2. Such return depends on
the degree of competition in the credit market. Entrepreneurs invest the loan obtained
by the bank in a (safe) project which yields V > 1 at t = 2 and gives the bank a (gross)
interest rate equal to
ri = V , (2.1)
where [ 1
V ;1] represents the degree of competition in the credit market. The higher 
the lower the competition in the credit market and the higher the return to the bank
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from granting loans. When  = 1
V , the credit market is perfectly competitive. The bank
obtains ri = 1 and the entrepreneur retains the whole surplus V generated by the project.
The other extreme, when  = 1, represents the case of a monopolistic credit market
when the bank obtains the whole surplus V from the projects. Entrepreneurs are just
indierent between taking the loan or not as they are assumed to have a zero opportunity
cost. Intermediate values of  measure intermediate degrees of competition in the credit
market, when banks and entrepreneurs share the surplus generated by the project. In
this sense, (2.1) can be interpreted as the result of a Nash bargaining process between the
bank and the entrepreneurs. While being a shortcut, (2.1) captures the general idea that
the return for the bank reduces as competition increases. In what follows, for simplicity
we refer to ri as being set by the bank according to (2.1).
Although they are illiquid, loans can be sold on an interbank market at date 1 for a
price P. Participation in this market is limited in that banks can buy and sell loans in this
market but consumers cannot. The price P is endogenously determined in equilibrium by
the aggregate demand and supply of liquidity in the market, as explained further below.
The timing of the model is as follows. At date 0, banks choose the deposit contract
(c1;c2) to oer to consumers and how to split their funds between reserves and loans so
to maximize their expected prots. In doing so, they anticipate that at date 1, after the
liquidity shocks are realized, they may buy or sell loans on the market at the price P.
All uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of date 1. In particular, depositors learn
whether they are early or late consumers and the value of  is determined. The type of each
consumer remains, however, private information. An early consumer cannot misrepresent
his type because he needs to consume at date 1; but a late consumer can claim to be an
early consumer, withdraw c1 at date 1, store it until date 2 and then consume it. To avoid
this, the deposit contract that the bank oers to consumers must be incentive compatible
and guarantee that the residual payment to late consumers at date 2 is at least c1. This
Leonello, Agnese (2011), Three Essays in Competition and Banking 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/307192.2. THE MODEL 11
requires the following constraint to be satised:
c1 + (1   )c1
P
ri
 Ri + PLi: (2.2)
The left hand side is the present value of the consumers' claims on bank i at date 1 when
the late consumers receive at least c1. The rst term represents the consumption given
to the  early consumers. The second term (1   )c1 is the consumption given to the
late consumers discounted at its present value
P
ri . The right hand side is the value of the
bank's portfolio. The bank has Ri units of reserves and Li units of loans worth P per
unit. Thus, condition (2.2) is necessary and sucient for the deposit contract c1 to satisfy
incentive compatibility and the budget constraint simultaneously. If (2.2) is satised, the
bank does not default. The early consumers withdraw at date 1 and the late consumers
wait till date 2. If, instead, (2.2) is not satised a run occurs and the bank is liquidated
at date 1. The late consumers nd it optimal to withdraw at date 1 as, if they left their
funds in the bank till date 2; they would receive less than early consumers. The bank has
to sell all its loans, consumers receive a pro rata share and the bank obtains nothing. We
assume that this is the only case where a run occurs in the model. That is, (sunspot) runs
do not occur when (2.2) is satised.
This discussion suggests that there can be dierent equilibria of the model, depending
on whether (2.2) is satised or not. In particular, the model has two equilibria. In the
rst, that we dene as no default equilibrium, (2.2) is satised for all banks so that none
defaults at date 1. In the second, that we dene as mixed equilibrium, (2.2) is satised for
some banks, that we call safe, but not for others, that we call risky. The safe banks do not
default, but the risky default in some state of the world. The two types of banks hold a
dierent portfolio allocation between reserves and loans. This implies that, although there
is no idiosyncratic liquidity shock in the model, there is trade in the interbank market at
date 1, as we describe in detail below. In what follows we derive the two equilibria in turn.
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2.3 The no default equilibrium
The no default equilibrium exists when consumers' incentive compatibility constraint (2.2)
is always satised so that no bank defaults at date 1. Given that all banks remain active till
date 2 and they are all identical, they will choose the same initial allocation of reserves and
loans. There is no trade on the interbank market so that the price P does not have real
eects on the equilibrium allocation. Given all this, we can simply analyze a representative
bank in the economy. In what follows we also assume that depositors have a logaritmic
utility function, that is u(ct) = ln(ct) with t = 1;2. This simplies the determination of
the deposit contract without aecting the results.
The bank chooses the deposit contract (c1;c2) and the portfolio allocation (Ri;Li)
simultaneously so to maximize its expected prot at t = 0. The bank's maximization
problem is given by
Max
c1;c2;Ri;Li
i = riLi+(Ri Lc1)+(1 )(Ri Hc1) [(1 L)+(1 )(1 H)]c2 (2.3)
subject to
Ri + Li = 1
c1  Ri (2.4)
(1   )c2  riLi + Ri   c1 (2.5)
E[u(c1;c2;)] = [L + (1   )H]u(c1) + [(1   L) + (1   )(1   H)]u(c2)  0
(2.6)
c2  c1 (2.7)
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for any  = L;H and taking into account that the loan rate ri is given by (2.1). Given
there is no trade at date 1 and no default in equilibrium, the expression for the bank's prot
i is given by sum of the returns from the loans riLi and the expected excess of liquidity
(Ri Lc1)+(1 )(Ri Hc1) minus the expected payments [(1 L)+(1 )(1 H)]c2
to depositors at date 2. The rst constraint represents the budget constraint at date 0:
The next two constraints represent the budget constraints at date 1 and 2. Constraint
(2.4) requires that at date 1 the bank needs enough reserves to satisfy its demand for
liquidity as given by c1 for any  = L;H. Constraint (2.5) requires that at date 2 the
promised amount to the late consumers (1 )c2 must not exceed the resources available
to the bank riLi + Ri   c1. Constraint (2.6) is consumers' participation constraint. It
requires that the utility E[u(c1;c2;)] that they receive when depositing their endowment
at the bank must be at least equal to the one they would obtain from storing their initial
endowment. This is simply equal to 0 given the assumption of logaritmic utility function.
Constraint (2.7) is the consumers' incentive compatibility constraint. It requires that the
promised repayments c1 and c2 at date 0 are such that the late consumers do not run at
date 1. Note that (2.7) together with (2.4) and (2.5) imply that (2.2) is satised for any
P.
We have the following result.
Proposition 1 In the no default equilibrium, each bank invests an amount RND =
HcND




L + (1   )H







L + (r   )H
L + (1   )H
L+(1 )H
> 1: (2.9)
Proof. See appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. In the no default equilibrium all banks
behave alike. They have the same initial portfolio allocation and oer consumers the same
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deposit contract. In order to avoid default, they need to hold an amount of reserves large
enough to satisfy the highest liquidity demand by early consumers at date 1 in state H.
Since the loan rate is r  1 and there is no trade on the interbank market, they do not nd
it optimal to hold reserves in excess of the amount needed. Since banks do not default,
deposits are safe and consumers always received their promised repayments. The deposit
contract maximizes the bank's expected prot while satisfying consumers' participation
with equality. The bank oers cND
2 > 1 > cND
1 except in perfect competition where r = 1
and thus cND
1 = cND
2 = 1. The reason is that banks need to hold a high level of reserves to
ensure themselves against the higher liquidity shock in state H. Holding reserves entails an
opportunity cost as represented by the foregone return r on the loans. Such a cost is higher
the lower is competition in the credit market. Choosing cND
1 < 1 and cND
2 > 1 allows
the bank to reduce its reserve holding while still being able to satisfy the early liquidity
demand at date 1 in state H and consumers' participation constraint. The promised
repayments cND
1 and cND
2 move in opposite direction as competition decreases. As the
opportunity cost of holding reserves increases as competition decreases, cND
1 decreases
with r = V while cND
2 increases.
From Proposition 1, the bank's expected prot in the no default equilibrium becomes
ND = V   cND
2 . (2.10)
The bank's prot is simply equal to the dierence between the return on loans and the
promised repayment cND
2 to the late consumers. This suggests that the reserves holdings
and the liquidity demand by the early consumers aect the bank's prots only to the extent
that they aect cND
2 : When the credit market is perfectly competitive so that  = 1
V , the
bank makes zero expected prot. In such case, the budget constraint (2.5) is binding for
any  = L;H.
Although there is no trade in the no default equilibrium, we need to determine the
price P in order to complete the characterization of the equilibrium. Given that there are
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two states of the world  = L;H, the price P is volatile and takes two values, PL and PH.
These prices have to be such that the market clears at both dates 0 and 1: This means
that the intertemporal returns of the two assets have to be equal. In state L banks have
an excess of liquidity as LcND
1 < HcND
2 . Thus, as banks have to be indierent between
using their excess of liquidity to buy loans and storing it for one additional period, it must
hold that
PL = r: (2.11)
A lower value of PL would imply that all banks would want to hold only the long asset,
while a higher value of PL would imply that they would be willing to hold only the short
asset. It then follows that PH must be such that banks are willing to hold both reserves








This implies that PH < 1 as PL > 1. Otherwise loans would dominate reserves at date 0:
2.4 The mixed equilibrium
So far we have assumed that (2.2) is always satised so that banks nd it optimal not to
default at date 1. However, avoiding default is costly as to do so banks have to keep a high
proportion of reserves and forego the higher return on the loans. If the costs of avoiding
default are large, banks may nd it optimal to choose a deposit contract and an initial
amount of reserves such that they default at date 1 with positive probability. This is a
consequence of the presence of aggregate uncertainty on the demand for liquidity at date
1 and the consequent price volatility across states. As we will see, the cost of avoiding
default depends on the parameter  representing the degree of competition in the credit
market. When  is low, the cost of avoiding default is low as the foregone return on the
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loan from keeping reserves is low. However, as  increases, such a cost increases and banks
may nd it optimal to default. In this section, we characterize the equilibrium when some
banks nd it optimal to default at date 1 in state H while some others remain always
solvent. We start by looking at the banks' problem. Then, we analyze the market clearing
conditions that must hold in equilibrium.
2.4.1 The banks' problem
Given that there is no uncertainty on the loan return, a bank defaults at date 1 only if
it violates (2.2) in some state. In equilibrium not all banks can default simultaneously.
If all banks made the same investments at date 0 and all default at date 1 there would
be no bank left on the other side of the market to buy the loans of the defaulting banks
so that P = 0. This cannot be an equilibrium since it would be optimal for a bank to
remain solvent and keep excess liquidity to buy up all the loans at the price P = 0. This
implies that in order to have default, the equilibrium must be mixed. Despite being ex
ante identical, banks must make dierent initial portfolio allocation decisions and oer
dierent deposit contracts to consumers. Some banks, that we dene safe, invest enough
in reserves at date 0 to remain solvent at date 1 in either state  = L;H for any P.
Others, that we dene as risky, choose instead an initial allocation of reserves and loans
such that they default at date 1 with positive probability. Given that they cannot default
in all states and there are only two states of the world in our model, at date 1 risky
banks remain solvent in state  = L and default in state  = H as their (2.2) is violated.
Safe and risky banks have therefore dierent maximization problems at date 0 when they
choose the deposit contract and the initial portfolio allocation between loans and reserves.
However, in equilibrium safe and risky banks must have the same expected prots as they
have to be indierent between being either of the two types.
As in the no default equilibrium, at date 0 banks choose the deposit contract and the
portfolio allocation simultaneously. Consumers know the type of banks they deposit their
endowment in so that the safe and the risky banks must oer dierent deposit contracts
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to consumers. Either contract has to guarantee that consumers have an expected utility
at least as large as the utility they could receive from storing their endowment.
We start by characterizing the problem for the safe banks. This is similar to the one in
the no default equilibrium, with the dierence that the safe banks have now the possibility
to buy loans from the risky banks on the interbank market at date 1. Given the market
prices PH and PL, each safe bank chooses simultaneously the deposit contract (cS
1;cS
2) and

















RS + LS = 1
cS












2;)] = [L + (1   )H]u(cs






In contrast to the no default equilibrium, there is now trade on the interbank market at
date 1: The expression for the bank's prot S is given by the sum of the returns from the
loans rLS and from the expected excess of liquidity (
RS LcS
1




states L and H minus the expected payments [(1 L)+(1 )(1 H)]cS
2 to depositors
at date 2. Safe banks can use any excess liquidity at date 1 to acquire loans from the risky
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banks. With probability  the safe bank has RS LcS
1 units of liquidity in excess and can
use them to buy
RS LcS
1
PL units of loans from the risky banks yielding a per-unit return
of r. Similarly for state H. The rst constraint represents the budget constraint at date
0, which is always satised with equality to indicate that the bank invests all its funds at
date 0. Constraint (2.14) requires that the safe bank has enough reserves RS to satisfy
the liquidity demand cS
1 of the early consumers at date 1 in either state. Constraint
(2.15) requires that the bank has enough resources at date 2 to repay the promised amount
(1 )cS
2 to the late consumers. Constraint (2.16) guarantees that the consumers receive
an expected utility from the deposit contract at least equal to the utility u(1) = 0 that they
would obtain from storing their endowment. Constraint (2.17) is simply the consumers'
incentive compatibility constraint. Together with (2.15), this guarantees that also the
incentive compatibility constraint for the late consumers at date 1 as in (2.2) is satised
so that the safe banks never experience a run at date 1.
The risky banks solve a similar problem with the dierence that they default in state
H at date 1. In state L they may have to sell loans but have enough resources to repay
the promised amounts (cR
1 ;cR
2 ) to consumers and make non negative expected prots. In
state H they sell all the loans and go bankrupt. Early and late consumers receive the
proceeds from the sale as given by RR+PHLR < cR
1 . Each risky bank chooses the deposit
contract (cR
1 ;cR
2 ) and the initial allocation of funds between reserves RR and loans LR to















RR + LR = 1
LcR
1  RR + PLLR (2.19)
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The risky banks have positive expected prots only when with probability  state L
occurs. These are equal to the returns from the initial investment in loans rLR minus the
foregone return r on the (
LcR
1  RR
PL ) units of loans that they sell at date 1 at the price PL
and the expected repayments (1   L)cR
2 to the late consumers. The rst constraint is
the usual budget constraint at date 0, which always binds. The second constraint is the
resource constraint at date 1 in state L. It requires that the maximum possible resources
RR + PLLR that the risky bank obtains from its reserve holdings and the proceeds from
the sale of all its loans are enough to satisfy the promised repayments LcR
1 to the early
consumers at date 1. Constraint (2.20) ensures that in state L the bank has enough
resources at date 2 to repay the late consumers their promised repayment (1   L)cR
2 .
Note that constraint (2.20) implies that (2.19) is also satised. Constraint (2.21) requires
that the deposit contract satises the constraint that the consumers' expected utility
E[u(cR
1 ;cR
2 ;)] is at least equal to the utility u(1) = 0 they would obtain from storing
their endowment. Dierently from before, the depositors of a risky bank receive the
promised repayment (cR
1 ;cR
2 ) only in state L, while they receive the proceeds RR +PHLR
of the bank's portfolio in state H. Finally, the deposit contract has to satisfy the incentive
constraint for the late consumers at date 0 as represented by the last constraint.
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2.4.2 Market clearing
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium it remains to be determined the prices
PH and PL, and the fractions  and 1    of safe and risky banks. To be an equilibrium
the solutions to the banks' maximization problems as described above must be consistent
with the market clearing conditions determining PH and PL. Moreover, the equilibrium
requires that the expected prot of a risky bank and of a safe bank are equal so that banks
are initially indierent between becoming either type.
We start by characterizing the market clearing conditions. Consider rst state L.
Market clearing requires that the total demand for liquidity equals the excess supply of
liquidity at date 1. Dene as  the number of safe banks and as 1  that of risky banks.
Then, it must hold that
(1   )LcR
1 = (RS   LcS
1); (2.23)
where the left hand side represents the total liquidity demand of the 1    risky banks in
state L and the right hand side the total net supply of liquidity of the  safe banks after
repaying LcS
1 to their early depositors. Condition (2.23) implicitly requires PL < r so
that the short asset is dominated between dates 1 and 2 and the safe banks are willing to
use all their excess liquidity to buy loans from the risky banks.
Now consider state H. The safe banks have a total excess of liquidity equal to (RS  
HcS
1) while risky banks must sell all their (1   )LR loans. Market clearing requires the
price PH to satisfy
(1   )PHLR = (RS   HcS
1). (2.24)
Condition (2.24) implies that there is cash-in-the-market pricing in state H as PH has
to equalize the total supply and the total demand for liquidity.
As mentioned above, in equilibrium banks have to be indierent between being a safe
or a risky bank. This requires the expected prots of safe and risky banks to be the same,
that is
S = R: (2.25)
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2 ;;PL;PHg: We have the following.
Proposition 2 The mixed equilibrium is characterized as follows:
1. The safe banks invest an amount RS in reserves and LS = 1   RS in loans, and













L + (1   )H








L + (PL   )H
L + (1   )H
L+(1 )H
> 1: (2.28)
2. The risky banks invest an amount
RR = 0
in reserves and LR = 1 in loans, and oer consumers a deposit contract (cR
1 ;cR










2   r(1   )

> 1: (2.30)










1 + RS   LcS
1
< 1: (2.32)
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Proof. See appendix A.
The proposition shows that safe and risky banks behave quite dierently. Safe banks
hold more reserves than the amount they need to satisfy their own early liquidity demand
in state H: The amount in excess that each safe bank holds,
1 
 PH, has to be enough to
absorb the supply of loans of the risky banks in state H as given by (1   )PH.
As in the no default equilibrium, the safe banks do not default and always repay
their consumers the promised repayments. They still oer cS
2 > 1 > cS
1 except in perfect
competition where r = 1 and thus cS
1 = cS
2 = 1. As  increases, cS
1 and cS
2 move in opposite
direction. The only dierence with the no default equilibrium is that cS
2 and cS
1 depend
on the price PL as well as on r as there is now trade on the interbank market.
The risky banks do not hold any reserves and default in state H. As they anticipate
their default in state H, risky banks nd it optimal to invest everything in loans at date
0. At date 1 they sell
LcR
1
PL units of loans to satisfy the liquidity demand LcR
1 of the early
depositors in state L while they sell everything and default in state H. Depositors at risky
banks receive the promised repayments cR
1 and cR






PL  1 as long as PL  r.
The prices PL > 1 and PH < 1 adjust so to sustain the mixed equilibrium. This means
that the interbank market clears in each state and safe banks are willing to hold the excess
of reserves needed at date 0. The proportion of safe banks is always smaller than one, and
safe and risky banks make the same expected prots in equilibrium. The price volatility
crucially depends on the aggregate uncertainty of the liquidity demand. Given that there
is excess liquidity in state L relatively to state H, it must be the case that PL > 1 > PH.
2.5 Existence of equilibria
So far we have characterized two types of equilibria. In the no default equilibrium all
banks hold enough reserves to satisfy their liquidity demand at date 1 for any  = L;H
and do not default. In the mixed equilibrium, banks are heterogenous. A fraction  hold
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enough reserves and do not default. The remaining fraction (1   ) chooses optimally to
invest only in loans and default at date 1 in state H. There is trade on the interbank
market, and the prices clear the market in both states at date 1 and at date 0.
In deriving the two equilibria we have so far abstracted from their existence. The no
default equilibrium, as characterized in Proposition 1, exists if and only if no bank has an
incentive to hold a lower amount of reserves and default at date 1 in state H. A deviation
entailing higher reserves than in equilibrium is not protable as it implies foregoing the
higher returns from the loans without giving the possibility to use the excess liquidity on
the interbank market. Similarly, for the mixed equilibrium in Proposition 2 to exist, the
safe banks must be willing to buy the loans from the risky banks at date 1. This implies
to verify that the equilibrium market prices PL and PH are within the feasible ranges.
We now turn to characterizing the existence of the equilibria as a function of the
parameters of the model. In particular, we analyze how this depends on the degree of
competition in the credit market. We start with the no default equilibrium.
2.5.1 Existence of the no default equilibrium
In the no default equilibrium all banks hold an amount of reserves RND = HcND
1 . This
allows all banks to satisfy their early liquidity demand in any state of the economy and
avoid default. However, it entails an opportunity cost in that banks forego the higher
return r on the loans on each unit of reserves that they hold. Such opportunity cost is
higher the lower is the level of competition on the credit market. Thus, as  increases,
it may be optimal for banks to reduce their amount of reserves so to appropriate the
higher returns of the loans. To see whether this becomes protable, we consider unilateral
deviations from the equilibrium.
A deviating bank chooses the amount of reserves to hold and the deposit contract
(cd
1;cd
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subject to
Rd + Ld = 1












1) + (1   L)u(cd
2)] + (1   )[u(Rd + PHLd)]  0 (2.34)
The maximization problem of the deviating bank is similar to that of the risky banks
in the mixed equilibrium. Since the deviating bank holds Rd < RND, it makes positive
expected prot in state L and defaults in state H: With probability  it obtains the return
rLd from the initial investment in loans minus the losses r(
Lcd
1 Rd
PL ) from the sale of the
loans on the interbank market needed to satisfy all the demands of the early consumers
at date 1 if Lcd
1  Rd > 0 and the repayments (1 L)cd
2 to the late consumers at date 2.
The rst constraint is the usual resource constraint at date 0. The next two constraints
are the resource constraints at dates 1 and 2 in state L. The last constraint is consumers'
participation constraint at date 0: The dierence relative to the mixed equilibrium is that
the market prices PL and PH are still given by (2.11) and (2.12) as in the no default
equilibrium, as the behavior of a deviating bank does not inuence them. This implies
that, given that it can sell loans at the price PL = r in state L at date 1, the deviating
bank nds it protable to invest all in loans at date 0.
The no default equilibrium exists as long as deviating is not protable, that is as long
as ND  d. We have the following result.
Proposition 3 For [V  
1  ]1  + V (1   ) < 1, there exists a degree of credit market
competition  2 ( 1
V ;1) such that the no default equilibrium exists for any   :
Proof. See appendix A. 
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The proposition shows that the no default equilibrium exists only for high degrees of
competition in the credit market. In equilibrium banks hold enough reserves to satisfy
the liquidity demands by the early consumers in state H. This ensures that they do not
default in either state, but it leads to an excess of liquidity in state L. Such an excess
is inecient at date 1 as banks can only store between dates 1 and 2 and it may make
a deviation protable. As competition decreases, it becomes increasingly protable for
a bank to reduce reserves and holding more loans. This entails higher prots than in
equilibrium in state L but it also implies that banks default at date 1 in state H. When
competition is intense, banks do not have an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
as the returns from investing in loans are too low to compensate them for defaulting in
state H. By contrast, as competition decreases, the loan rate r becomes high enough to
make the deviation protable. The condition [V  
1  ]1  +V (1 ) < 1 requires that the
probability  of the occurrence of state L and the return V on the loans are high enough
to ensure that deviating is protable when the credit market is monopolistic, that is when
 is equal to 1. Thus, it also represents a sucient condition for the existence of  in the
interval ( 1
V ;1).
2.5.2 Existence of the mixed equilibrium
The mixed equilibrium as characterized in Proposition 2 exists when the safe banks are
willing to buy the loans from the risky banks at date 1. This implies to verify that the
equilibrium market prices PL and PH are within the feasible ranges. The price PL must
be in the interval
1 < PL < r: (2.35)
The lower bound guarantees that there is enough price volatility so that the safe banks
are willing to invest in both reserves and loans at date 0. The upper bound ensures that
they are willing to use any excess of liquidity to buy the loans in state L at date 1. From
(2.31), the price PH adjusts with PL so that the market always clears. This implies that
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as long as (2.35) is satised, PH is also in the admissible range. Thus, (2.35) is the only
condition that matters for the existence of the mixed equilibrium. We have the following
result.
Proposition 4 For any  >  2 ( 1
V ;1); it holds 1 < PL < r and the mixed equilibrium
exists:
Proof. See appendix A. 
Proposition 4 states that the mixed equilibrium does not exist for high values of com-
petition in the credit market. The intuition is analogous to the one for the existence of the
no default equilibrium. The risky banks can make the same expected prots as the safe
banks only if they are able to compensate the default in state H with high prots in state
L. When competition is intense, the return V from the loans is low. Thus, the risky
banks can make the same prot as the safe banks only if they can sell their loans at a high
price in state L. For  < , the required price for R = S is PL > r. However, at this
price, the safe banks are unwilling to buy loans and thus the equilibrium does not exist.
For  > , the loan return V is high enough so to ensure that the condition R = S
is satised for a price PL < r.
Taken together, Propositions 3 and 4 show that the existence of the two equilibria is
continuous in the parameter  representing the degree of competition in the credit market.
The two equilibria converge at the level  = : The intuition is that starting with the
no default equilibrium, as  reaches , it becomes protable for a bank to deviate by
lowering its reserve holdings. As all banks are alike, more banks have an incentives to do
the same. The equilibrium jumps to the mixed one with 1  banks becoming risky. Thus,
at  =  the two equilibria coexist with PL = r and all banks have the same prots, that
is ND = d = R = S.
Figure 1 shows the deposit contract that banks oer to depositors.
The gure shows that all the promised consumption levels to the late consumers in-
crease with  while those to the early consumers decrease. The intuition is that as 
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Figure 2.1: Deposit contract
increases, the opportunity cost of holding reserves increases and banks nd it optimal to
reduce the promised repayments to the early consumers so to reduce their reserve holdings.
Thus, the promised repayments to the late consumers have to increase so to satisfy the
consumers' participation constraint. The deposit contracts oered by the banks in the no
default equilibrium and by the safe ones in the mixed equilibrium are equal at  = . In
the mixed equilibrium, the safe banks oer a more volatile deposit contract than the risky








L + (PL   )H









for any r and 1 < PL  r as
L+(PL )H
L+(1 )H > 1: Both banks promise dierent amounts
to the early and late depositors to reduce the liquidity needed at date 1 to satisfy the
demand of the early depositors. To have more liquidity at date 1 safe banks need to
hold a greater amount of reserves initially and forego the higher return r on the loans.
This eect is more important as  increases as the opportunity cost of holding reserves
increases. Thus, cS
1 decreases with  and cS
2 increases as to allow depositors to break even
in expectation. Risky banks obtain instead liquidity at date 1 by selling their loans. This
also entails giving up the return r on the loans sold but, given PL > 1, it is less costly
than holding reserves initially. The risky banks promise then dierent amounts to early
and late consumers but the volatility of the contract they oer is lower than that of the
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safe banks.














Figure 2.2: Price volatility
The gure shows that price volatility increases with  in both equilibria. The price PL
increases with  as it is linked to the fundamental value r of the loans, which increases
with . Thus, as prices must move in opposite directions to make banks willing to hold
both assets at date 0, PH decreases.
2.6 Discussion
Propositions 3 and 4 have important implications in terms of the eects of credit market
competition on the stability of the banking system. When competition is intense, only the
no default equilibrium exists. As competition decreases and  reaches the level , only the
mixed equilibrium exists. Thus, the banking system becomes riskier as the credit market
becomes less competitive. Even if it entails default, the functioning of the interbank
market in the mixed equilibrium reduces the opportunity cost of holding reserves for the
safe banks and allows the risky banks not to keep reserves and still obtain enough liquidity
not to default in state L: This may have a positive eect on welfare as it may expand the
initial investment in loans. To see this, consider the welfare in the two equilibria. In both
cases, the welfare is given by the sum of banks' expected prots, entrepreneurs' surplus
and consumers' expected utility. Given that banks are monopolist on the deposit side,
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consumers' expected utility is simply equal to zero. Welfare is then given by
WND = r   cND
2 + (V   r)(1   RND)
in the no default equilibrium, and by
WM = r   cS
2 + (V   r)

(1   ) + (1   RS)

= r   cS





in the mixed equilibrium. At  =  where the two equilibria coexist, cND
2 = cS
2 and
WM > WND if RS < RND. Thus, the mixed equilibrium is welfare improving if it allows
the banking system to hold fewer reserves and more loans in aggregate.
This result seems to suggest that banks' default is optimal in our model. However, it
hinges upon the fact that entrepreneurs are always willing to borrow from banks as long
as r  V and default is costless in that it does not entail any deadweight costs. If default
was costly, there would be a trade-o in the mixed equilibrium between the expansion
of loans and the bankruptcy costs. For example, if consumers would only appropriate a
fraction  of the proceeds PH of the sale of loans in state H, the risky banks would need
to increase the promised repayments cR
2 and cR
2 to consumers to compensate them for the
lower amounts they would obtain in state H. This would reduce the expected prots of
the risky banks and thus the range of values for  in which the mixed equilibrium exists.
The presence of bankruptcy costs would also negatively aect the social welfare, which
could then be lower in the mixed equilibrium.
2.7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have developed a simple model where banks trade loans to meet their
uncertain liquidity demands and the returns on loans depend on the degree of credit
market competition. We have shown that two types of equilibria can exist. In the no
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default equilibrium, banks are self sucient in that they hold enough reserves to meet
their liquidity demands in all states of the world. In the mixed equilibrium, banks make
very dierent initial allocative choices. A group of banks does not keep any reserves and
sell loans on the interbank market to satisfy their liquidity demands. In the state where
the aggregate liquidity demand is low, they sell a part of their loans and make positive
prots. In the other state, where the aggregate liquidity demand is high, they sell all
their loans and default. Thus, in the mixed equilibrium default is observed with positive
probability. The existence of the two equilibria depends on the degree of competition in
the credit market. When this is intense, then only the no default equilibrium exists, while
when it is low, only the mixed equilibrium exists. For intermediate values both equilibria
may coexist. This implies that the lack of competition is detrimental to nancial stability.
In our model banks are monopolist on the deposit market. An interesting extension
is to consider the case where there is perfect competition on the deposit market so that
banks choose their portfolio allocations in order to maximize consumers' expected utility
rather than their expected prots. This would have implications for the amounts promised
to consumers, banks' portfolio allocations and thus welfare.
We have modeled competition in the credit market as representing a Nash bargaining
game between the bank and the entrepreneurs. Our qualitative results hold for a more
general specication of competition as long as the returns from loans accruing to the bank
decrease in the degree of competition in the credit market.
2.8 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1: The bank's maximization problem has a simple solution. In
order to avoid default the bank chooses to keep enough reserves to cover its demand for
liquidity at date 1 in every state of the world. Given H > L, in equilibrium it must then
hold
RND = Hc1: (2.36)
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This implies that (2.4) is satised with equality in state H and with strict inequality
in state L, where there is an excess of liquidity. It is to show that the only other binding
constraint in equilibrium is the consumers' participation constraint as given by (2.6).






Substituting the expression for c2 and (2.36) into (2.3) gives





Dierentiating this with respect to c1, we obtain





1 as (2.8) in the proposition. Substituting (2.8) into (2.37) gives cND
2 as in
(2.9) in the proposition. 





2 ;;PL;PHg characterizing the mixed equilibrium as
the solution to the maximization problem of the safe and risky banks, the market
clearing conditions and the equality between the expected prot of risky and safe banks.
In the banks' maximization problems the only binding constraints are the consumers'
participation constraints given by (2.16) and (2.21). All other constraints representing
the resources constraints at dates 1 and 2 are satised with strict inequality, as shown in
Appendix B.
Consider rst the maximization problem for the safe banks. Using the Lagrangian,
this can be written as
S = S   S [[L + (1   )H]u(cs
1) + [(1   L) + (1   )(1   H)]u(cs
2)]:
The rst order conditions with respect to the reserves RS; cS
1, cS


















[L + (1   )H] (2.39)
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cS
2 =  S (2.40)
[L + (1   )H]u(cS
1) + [(1   L) + (1   )(1   H)]u(cS
2) = 0: (2.41)
Consider now the maximization problem of the risky banks. Using the Lagrangian,
this becomes
R = R   R 
[Lu(cR
1 ) + (1   L)u(cR
2 )] + (1   )[u(RR + PH(1   RR))]

:
The rst order conditions with respect to the reserves RR; cR
1 , cR





R(1   )(1   PH)










2 =  R (2.44)
[Lu(cR
1 ) + (1   L)u(cR
2 )] + (1   )[u(RR + PH(1   RR))] = 0: (2.45)
The equilibrium is the solution to the system of all the rst order conditions together
with (2.23), (2.23) and (2.25).
A convenient way to solve the system is to start by using (2.38) to derive PH as in
(2.31). Then, we derive RS as in (2.26) from (2.23). Using (2.40), (2.39) and (2.41) after
substituting (2.31) gives cS
1 and cS
2 as in (2.27) and (2.28) in the proposition.
Using (2.43) and (2.44), we can express cR















1   PL)  0
for any PL   1 > 1 and cR
1   PL  0. The former follows from (2.31), as otherwise
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PH > 1 > PL. This contrasts with the equilibrium where PL > PH must hold as there is
more excess of liquidity in state L than in state H. The latter, cR
1   PL  0; follows from
the fact that the prots of the risky banks must be non-negative in equilibrium. To see






















RRr < 0 for PL > 1, R  0 requires






Rewriting r as Lr + (1   L)r and rearranging the terms gives
(1   L)(r   cR





This is positive if PL cR
1 > 0 as this implies also that r cR
2 > 0. Consider PL cR
1 < 0.
Then, from (2.44), it is cR
2 > r and (2.47) is negative. Then, in equilibrium PL   cR
1 > 0
must hold. It then follows that RR = 0 as in the proposition.
To nd cR
2 as in the proposition we rst rearrange (2.25) as
















+ r(1   ) + cR
2   [(1   L) + (1   )(1   H)]cS
2 = 0:
From (2.38) [ 1 + 
PL + 1 









1 = [L + (1   )H]cS
2.
Substituting these into the expression above for S   R, we have cR
2 as in (2.30) in the
proposition.
Finally, from (2.21) and (2.23), we have PL and  as in (2.32) in the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 3: The maximization problem of the deviating bank is the
same as the one of the risky banks in the proof of Proposition 2. The rst order conditions
with respect to the reserves Rd; cd
1, cd
2 and d are as (2.42), (2.43), (2.44) and (2.45). The
only dierence is that PL = r and thus PH =
r(1 )
r  . The solutions to the rst order
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Substituting these expressions into (2.33) gives
d = (r   cd):
To see when deviating is protable, it remains to compare d and ND from (2.10) as
a function of . In perfect competition when  = 1
V and r = 1, ND = d = 0 since from
(2.8), (2.9) and (2.48), cND
1 = cND
2 = cd = 1. Dierentiating ND and d with respect to
 and rearranging the expressions, we have
@ND
@
= V (1   HcND





























and d = 

V   (V  
1  )1 

. Rearranging these expression,





= (L + (1   )H)L+(1 )H 
(1   )2 V + (V   )1 
+
 (1   )1 (L + (V   )H)
L+(1 )H:
Since L +(V  )H > L +(1 )H, ND  d < 0 if (1 )1  > (1 )2 V +
(V  )1 , from which [V  
1  ]1  +V (1 ) < 1 as in the proposition. Thus, it exists
 2 ( 1
V ;1) such that ND   d  0 for any    and ND   d < 0 otherwise. The
proposition follows. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Recall that in the mixed equilibrium S = R and note
from (2.18) that R increases with PL for any given . Moreover, R = d and S = ND
when PL = r. Thus, as d = ND at  =  and R = S in the mixed equilibrium, it
must also hold d = ND = R = S at  = . Consider now a value of  < , where
d < ND from Proposition 3. It follows that R 
PL=r < S 
PL=r : For R = S to
hold as required in the mixed equilibrium, it must then be PL > r. Consider now a value
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Thus, it must be PL < r for R = S. It follows that the mixed equilibrium exists only
for   . 
2.9 Appendix B
In this Appendix we prove that the resource constraints in the banks maximization prob-
lems are non binding.
Proof Constraint (2.15)


















Multiply both sides by PL and add and subtract r on the right hand side. The expres-
sion simplies to
PL(1   L)cS















(L+(PL )H) from (2.39) into the expression above, after
some algebraic manipulations;, it gives:
PL [HPL   (H   L)   (PL   1)HL]cS
2  r(L + (PL   )H)(PL(1   RS) + RS):
It can be easily seen that the right hand side is increasing in RS as PL > 1. Thus, if the








(L + (1   )H)

(L + (1   )H)
(L + (PL   )H)
:
Adding and subtract H on the left hand side, the expression above can be rewritten
as follows:
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cS
1 (L + (1   )H)   cS
1(PL   1)(1   H  (L + (1   )H)
that holds as the second term on the left hand side is negative and cS
1 < 1.


























The right hand side is positive for any PH < 1, while the left hand side is negative as
r > cS
2 and cS
1 < 1. Thus, the condition always holds.
Proof Constraint(2.22)

































thus the constraint is always satised in equilibrium. 
It remains to show that in state H, risky banks are not able to pay to the late consumers









Using RR = 0 and cR
2 = r
PLcR
1 in the condition above we have
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Substituting the expression forPH =
PL(1 )
PL  from (2.31) and rearranging the terms
we have
H(PL   1)cR
1 > (PL   cR
1 )(1   ):
Given cR
1 > 1, a sucient condition for the constraint to hold is H > (1   ).
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Joint with Emanuela Iancu
3.1 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis unveiled the fragility of the nancial system and the inadequacy
of the regulatory framework to prevent the crisis and contain its negative eects. Having
started in the subprime mortgage market, the turmoil spread to the whole nancial in-
dustry and to the real sector.
The high interconnectedness of the nancial system facilitated contagion. The distress of
few nancial intermediaries spilled over to the whole sector, through direct and indirect
linkages. The existence of these interdependencies amplied the eects of the shock in the
nancial system and hindered a proper assessment of individual risk in the global context.
Connections between nancial institutions stem from both the asset and the liability side
of their balance sheet (see Allen and Babus, 2009 for a survey). On one hand, connections
allow for better diversication so reducing the risk at individual bank level. On the other
hand, they prompt a higher correlation of the portfolios of nancial intermediaries and,
as the recent nancial crisis showed, in case of a negative shock, make the system less
39
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resilient.
One major source of instability during the recent nancial crisis was the liquidity risk.
Banks with a shortage of liquidity were not able to obtain the liquidity they needed.
Uncertainty about the counterparty risk played an important role in prompting the mal-
functioning of interbank markets, making dicult for the banks in distress to meet their
liquidity demand. Being not able to obtain the liquidity on the interbank market, those
banks were forced to sell assets at re-sale prices. Due to the high interconnectedness,
the distress of few institutions propagated in the banking system through mark-to-market
accounting, setting the ground for contagion. Marking-to-market requires rms to book
their assets and liabilities at fair values. When prices reect the fundamentals, this ac-
counting standard guarantees a true measure of the value of the company. This does
not hold when other factors aect the prices (i.e. liquidity) as mark-to-market induces
rms to underestimate (or overestimate) prots. The recent nancial crisis highlighted
the drawbacks of this accounting principle as several banks sold their assets at re-sale
prices, bringing banks with correlated exposures on the brink of insolvency.
This paper aims at capturing these features and at highlighting the mechanism through
which contagion rises. We develop a simple two periods theoretical model in which prot-
maximizing banks are subject to both credit and liquidity risk. Banks raise deposits from
risk-averse consumers and invest the proceeds in a safe asset and a risky project. In order
to hedge against the credit risk, at the initial date a bank exchanges shares of its project
with other banks, further referred to as neighbors. As a result, a nancial network is
formed. Banks face idiosyncratic uncertainty relative to their demand for liquidity, as a
stochastic fraction of their depositors are early consumers. All uncertainty is resolved at
the interim period: each bank receives perfect information about the return of its portfolio
and the distribution of idiosyncratic demand for liquidity becomes common knowledge.
At the interim period, for a given initial investment in liquidity, some banks face a shortage
and some an excess of liquidity. Banks facing a shortage of liquidity have two possibilities
to meet their liquidity needs: i) they can borrow from their neighbors with an excess of
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liquidity; ii) they can sell assets to outside investors. We assume the existence of a specic
market for each asset. Investors have no information about the return of the assets the
banks sell. The asymmetric information gives rise to adverse selection, forcing the banks
to sell the assets at re-sale prices.
Banks sell assets only if they can not borrow from their neighbors with an excess of liquid-
ity. Resorting to the interbank market has the benet of avoiding re-sales and therefore a
temporary depression of the portfolio value. Due to mark-to-market accounting, re-sale
prices aect the balance sheets of all banks holding that particular asset under distress
and hence their solvency. When becoming insolvent, a bank has to liquidate its portfolio,
triggering the drop in value of further assets. The domino eect prompted by re-sales
emerges eventually into a wave of bankruptcies.
The main result of the paper is that incomplete information may lead to interbank market
freeze and this, in turn, may trigger contagion through asset sales and mark-to-market
accounting. Under incomplete information, banks have dierent perceived probabilities
of bankruptcy. When the banks with excess of liquidity underestimate the risk of conta-
gion and expect those with a shortage to attach a higher probability to it, the former are
induced to demand excessively high interest rates. Such oers are rejected by the banks
in distress that prefer to resort to outside investors. As consequence, re sales trigger
contagion with positive probability.
The paper is related to various others. Several papers (Allen and Gale (2000), Cifuentes,
Ferrucci and Shin (2005), Caballero and Simsek (2010)) have analyzed contagion in -
nancial networks. In a network in which banks are connected through interbank deposits,
Allen and Gale (2000) discuss the optimality of dierent network structures in terms of
nancial stability. They show that complete networks are more resilient to contagion as
banks' exposure to other institutions are smaller. Cifuentes et al. (2005) analyze the
interplay of mark-to-market accounting and regulatory requirements. They show that it
may negatively aect nancial stability in a network in which banks are connected through
direct and indirect linkages. As in our paper, contagion mainly arises through asset sales
Leonello, Agnese (2011), Three Essays in Competition and Banking 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/3071942 3. FINANCIAL NETWORKS, INTERBANK MARKET BREAKDOWNS AND CONTAGION
and re sale prices. The main dierence with our paper is that uncertainty plays no role
as the network is complete. In Caballero and Simsek (2010), instead, uncertainty plays a
crucial role. Banks do not have information about the soundness of the other players. As
they are part of a nancial network, this information is crucial to assess the actual risk of
being hit indirectly by a shock. Complexity generates a large uncertainty and reduces the
incentive of banks to provide liquidity to the market having a negative eect on nancial
stability. In this respect, this paper diers from ours. In our model, interbank market
freeze does not occur because banks are reluctant to lend but rather because they demand
an excessively high interest rate so to exploit the informational rent in the transaction
with the borrowers.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the functioning of interbank market. Vari-
ous papers have analyzed the ineciency in the interbank market. Acharya, Gromb and
Yorulmazer focus on market power; Heider, Hoerova (2009), instead, consider asymmetric
information. In Gale and Yorulmazer (2010) frictions on the interbank market are due
to incompleteness of the market. They show that the liquidity hoarding emerged during
the recent nancial crisis was a consequence of speculative and precautionary motives.
Uncertainty about the counterparty risk as well as the possibility of using the excess liq-
uidity to buy assets at lower future prices induced banks to hold liquidity in excess rather
than provide it to the interbank market. The precautionary and speculative motives are
also important features in our model to explain the interbank market freeze and nancial
contagion.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 and 4 characterize
the equilibria in the complete and incomplete information case, respectively. In Section 5
we provide a numerical example and section 6 concludes.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Environment
Consider a three date economy t = 0;1;2 with four regional banks i 2 N = fA;B;C;Dg,
depositors and outside investors.
At date 0, banks raise one unit of resources from depositors and invest a fraction x into a
safe asset and 1   x in a risky project.
Assets
Each unit invested in the safe asset returns  units,  > 1 in the subsequent period. The





RL w. pr. 
RH w. pr. (1   )
(3.1)
at date 2, with RH > 1 > RL, 8i 2 N. The expected return of the risky project is higher
than the one of the safe asset
RL + (1   )RH  2: (3.2)
Returns are independently distributed across banks.
To hedge against the possibility that the risky project returns RL, at date 0 banks exchange
equal shares of their risky projects with two other banks, henceforth called neighbors.
A nancial network is formed (Figure 1). Each bank holds a share
(1 x)
3 of its neighbors'
projects in its portfolio.
The network is represented by a matrix g = (gij)i;j2N, where gij = 8
> > <
> > :
1 if i and j exchanged assets
0 otherwise
Leonello, Agnese (2011), Three Essays in Competition and Banking 
European University Institute
 




Figure 3.1: The Financial Network
8i 2 N;i 6= j,
Since each bank retains a portion of its own project, we have that gii = 1. Let Ni be the
set of agents other than i holding a portion of i's long asset: Ni = fj 2 Nnfig;j gij = 1g.
We further dene i's neighborhood as himself and his neighbors, i.e. e Ni = Ni [ fig
Given the network described above, we can formally describe the set of possible distribu-













1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1




























There is a continuum of mass one of depositors in each region. Depositors are ex ante
identical but ex post two types can be distinguished: early and late. Early type only
wants to consume at date 1, while the others prefer to consume at date 2. Their initial
endowment of one unit is deposited into a bank in exchange for the contract (1;c2). To
avoid a run, late depositors are promised c2  1.
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L w. pr. 1
2
H w. pr. 1
2
(3.4)
8i 2 N, with 0 < L < H < 1.
The fraction of early depositors is bank specic. There is no aggregate liquidity shock and
the total fraction of early depositors is one. For simplicity, we replace L and H with (1 
) and , respectively. All uncertainty is resolved at date 1. Banks observe the realization
of i and this information becomes common knowledge. Due to the idiosyncratic liquidity
shock, two banks have an excess of liquidity and two a shortage. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the banks with excess of liquidity are A and C, whereas the ones with a
shortage are B and D. Banks with an excess of liquidity have always enough resources to
provide liquidity to one bank in distress. It follows:
j x   (1   ) jj x    j.
Interbank Market
Banks in distress can meet their liquidity need borrowing from the banks with an excess
of liquidity on the interbank market at an interest rate r. The borrowing-lending game
starts at date 1 and has the following timeline:
I.a Banks with excess decide between non-lending and lending to either bank in distress.
The decisions become public knowledge.
I.b In case they lend, they choose the interest rate.
II.a Banks in distress decide whether to accept the oer or not.
II.b In case they reject, they resort to the asset market.
After stage I.a, four situations may arise: i) A and C lend to the same bank, ii) A and C
make oers to dierent banks, iii) only one lender makes an oer, iv) no oers are made
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to B and D. In the rst situation, A and C compete in oering the loan. In contrast,
banks behave as a monopolist in two circumstances: i) when they make oers to two
dierent banks; ii) in the case they are the only bank to make an oer.
Borrowing on the interbank market does not aect the value of banks' portfolio. No bank
has to book the assets at re sale price so contagion is avoided.
For a transaction to take place both lenders and borrowers must be willing to participate.
When no transaction takes place, banks with a shortage of liquidity resort to the asset
market.
Asset Market
Banks can sell a share of one of the long assets they hold to outside investors. If the
transaction takes place, investors pay the price P and get
(1 x)
3 of the asset put for sale.
The investors have no information on the realization of the risky project and have a
protable outside investment opportunity returning R0 at date 2. They are willing to
provide liquidity to the banks as long as it is more protable than investing in the outside
opportunity. For a suciently protable investment opportunity, it holds P < RL. This
captures the idea of re sales and ensures that only bank in distress eventually sell an
asset on the market.1




= (   x): (3.5)
Mark-to-market accounting and bankruptcy
According to mark-to-market accounting, banks must book their asset and liabilities at
the market values. At date 1, a bank is insolvent if the value of its assets is lower than
1An equivalent formalization is to consider P as an exogenous liquidation value.
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the value of the outstanding debt.





Rj < 1 (3.6)
The value of a bank's portfolio Vi is given by the sum of the return of the safe asset x
plus the market value of the bank's investment in the risky projects. The right hand
side is the value of bank's liabilities at date 1 as the bank has to pay one unit to all
potential consumers. The market value of bank's i risky assets is determined according to
the following rules:
 If the market is active, then the asset is booked at the market price P
 If the market is not active, the asset is booked at the " the price that would be re-
ceived by the holder of the nancial asset in an orderly transaction" i.e. fundamental
value.
When an asset is sold, its market value equals the price P paid by outside investors. As
consequence of mark-to-market accounting, the portfolio value of all banks holding that
asset is aected.
A bank is declared insolvent when
 It has three low return asset in its portfolio




 Two assets are sold




When two assets are sold in the economy there is at least one bank insolvent. Insolvency
forces the bank to liquidate its portfolio on the market at date 1, making zero prots.
Due to high correlation of banks' portfolios, this causes the bankruptcy of all other banks,
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as each of them has at least two out of three assets in portfolio to book at price P. In this
case, the distress of a single nancial institution spreads to the whole economy (contagion).
Information
The liquidity and credit shocks realize at date 1 and their distributions are stochastically
independent. The realization of liquidity shocks are common knowledge to all the banks,
the consumers and the investors. The return of the risky projects can be either common
knowledge to the banks- the complete information CI- or they can be private information
to the banks which hold the respective assets- the incomplete information II. Depositors
can perfectly monitor their banks.
We focus our attention on the cases in which the banks with excess of liquid-
ity are not direct neighbors of each other. Thus, sixteen cases can be identied.
We focus on the specic distribution of returns represented by the return vector
R = (RA;RB;RC;RD;) = (RL;RH;RL;RH), henceforth referred to as the true state of
the economy.
In the next two sections, we characterize the equilibria in the complete and incomplete
information framework. Then we compare the two scenarios so to show that interbank
market freeze may emerge as an equilibrium when uncertainty is introduced.
3.3 Complete Information Case
In the complete information case, each bank observes the realization of all the returns in
the economy. There is no uncertainty once the shocks realize at the interim period and the
banks' decisions are taken in a context of complete information. The state the economy
is described by the return vector and is represented in Figure 2.
As described in the previous section, banks A and C decide sequentially to whom to lend
and at which interest rate. Then, in case no transaction in the interbank market takes
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B RH  D RH 
Figure 3.2: True state of the economy.
place, B and D have to decide which asset to sell. We solve the problem by backward
induction starting from the subgame in which B and D sell their assets to outside investors
to repay their early consumers.
Stage 2
In the complete information case, the type spaces of banks are singleton sets
T CI
B =fRHg T CI
D = fRHg (3.9)
The action spaces are
AB = fsell A;sell B;sell Cg; (3.10)
AD = fsell A;sell D;sell Cg:






0 if aB 6= aD
(1 x)
3 (2RL + RH)  
(1 x)
3 aB   (1   )c2 if aB = aD
(3.11)
Both expressions represent the prots that bank i accrues at date 2. In case two dierent
assets are sold on the market, all banks in the economy are forced into early liquidation
at date 1 and they earn zero prots. When, instead, banks B and D sell the same asset,
all the banks in the economy survive to date 2 and B and D make positive prots. Their
prots are given by the return on the investment in the risky assets
(1 x)
3 (2RL + RH)
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minus the forgone return on the asset they sell to cover their liquidity demand
(1 x)
3 ai
and the promised repayment to the late depositors (1   )c2. The following proposition
establishes the equilibrium of the subgame between B and D.
Proposition 5 The B-D subgame has three pure strategies and one mixed strategy Nash
equilibria.
 The pure strategies Nash Equilibria are (a
B;a
D) 2 f(sell A, sell A), (sell C, sell C)
and (sell B, sell D)g





k is the optimal weight that players B and D put on playing the pure strategy
k 2 fA;B=D;Cg.
Proof. See Appendix. The intuition behind Proposition 5 is simple. Banks prefer
to coordinate and survive until date 2 as non-coordination triggers bankruptcy at date 1.
Despite miscoordination being a weakly dominated action, (sell B, sell D) emerges though
as a Nash equilibrium. In the pure strategy equilibria, bankruptcy occurs either with
probability 1 or 0.
Selling either low-asset (A or C) yields the same payos to both B and D. Hence, there
exists a mixed equilibrium, in which the two banks randomize between the two assets.
In the mixed equilibrium, there is a probability 1
2 of miscoordination and, in turn, of
bankruptcy.
Stage 1
Given the equilibria in the B and D's subgame, we move backward to the rst stage. In
what follows, we will only consider the mixed strategy equilibrium in which miscoordina-
tion and contagion emerge with positive probability.
As described in the previous section, the game at stage 1 between A and C (henceforth
called the A-C game) consists of two decisions: rst, A and C decide simultaneously upon
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a loan oer to either B or D. These decisions become common knowledge. When they
decide to lend, A and C engage in an interest-rate bidding process by submitting a take-
it-or-leave-it interest rate to the bank of their choice. If B and/or D accept the oer, the
game ends here. In case either of them declines, they enter the subgame in which they
sell assets to investors.
In the complete information case, the type spaces of A and C are singleton sets
T CI
A =fRLg T CI
C = fRLg
and the action spaces are
AA =foer to D;oer to B;no oerg  f[0;1[[f;gg (3.12)
AC =foer to D;oer to B;no oerg  f[0;1[[f;gg: (3.13)
We dene rmax and rmin as the maximum interest rate that the borrower is willing to
accept and the lowest interest rate demanded by the lender, respectively. For a transaction
on the interbank market to occur, it must be that the interest rate oered by the lender
is in an admissible range. The interest rates rmax and rmin represent the upper and lower


















The left hand side represents the borrower prots in case it borrows. They are given by
the date 2 return on its portfolio (RH + 2RL)
(1 x)
3 minus the promised repayment to the
late depositors (1 )c2 and the face value of the loan ( x)rmax. The right hand side
is, instead, its date 2 prots in case it met its liquidity needs selling an asset to outside
investors. With probability 1
2, B and D sell two dierent assets being forced into early
liquidation. With probability 1
2, instead, B and D sells the same asset. In this case, they
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survive to the nal date forgoing RL
(1 x)















Given that there is a positive probability of going bankrupt as consequence of miscoordi-
nation, B and D are willing to pay a higher interest rate than the forgone return
RL(1 x)
3
on the asset they sell on to outside investors. The additional amount they are willing





3   (1   )c2
i
equals the expected losses in case of
miscoordination. The interest rate that makes the lender indierent between lending and

















The left hand side represents the date 2 prots in case lending occurs. They are given by
the return on the investment in the risky asset (2RH + RL)
(1 x)
3 plus the return on the
investment of the excess liquidity (2x  1) plus the the return on the loan (  x)rmin
minus the expected repayment to the late depositors c2. The right hand side are the
prots in case A and C refrain from oering a loan, facing bankruptcy with probability 1
2.
In this case, A and C prots are given by the return on the risky projects
(1 x)
3 [2RH +RL]
plus the return on the safe asset (x   (1   )) minus the promised repayment to late














In case lending does not occur, A and C are forced into early liquidation with probability
1
2. The risk of bankruptcy is reected in the premium the lenders are willing to forgo
relatively to a bankruptcy-free equilibrium.
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For lending to occur, the following condition must hold
rmax > rmin: (3.16)
If this is the case, there exists a feasible range for the interest rate in which both lenders
and borrowers are willing to participate on the interbank market. Restricting our attention
to the parameter space in which (3.16) holds, the following proposition states the Nash
equilibria in the A-C game.
Proposition 6 When rmax > rmin, in equilibrium at least one bank receives a loan oer.
The oer is always accepted. Lending occurs and no bank is forced into early liquidation.
Proof. See Appendix.
Under complete information, lending occurs as long as rmax > rmin. The intuition behind
this result is very simple. For rmax > rmin, there exists an interest rate on which both
parties agree. The game has multiple equilibria in which in at least one loan oer is
accepted by the banks in distress. As long as the demanded interest rate is higher than
RL
(1 x)
3( x), only one bank would take the oer. This is the case because, when an oer is
accepted, there is no longer risk of contagion. Thus, conditional on the other bank having
accepted the oer, a bank with a shortage of liquidity is better o resorting to outside
investors giving up the amount RL
(1 x)
3 of its future prots.
If RL
(1 x)
3 < (   x), lenders have no incentive to demand an interest rate r < , once
an oer has been accepted. Thus, in equilibrium, only one bank in distress receives an
oer. In contrast, when RL
(1 x)
3 < (   x), the best response to a bank's successful
oer rmax is to demand RL
(1 x)
3( x). In this case, both banks B and D receive an oer.
Oering a loan to the same bank in distress emerges as an equilibrium only in the case
RL
(1 x)
3 < (   x) and it is a weakly dominated one.
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3.4 Incomplete Information
Under incomplete information, each player only observes the returns of its project and the
ones of its neighbors.
Like under complete information, the following distribution of returns R =
(RL;RH;RL;RH) describes the true state of the economy. Unlike in the complete in-
formation case, each bank assumes two possible states of the world. From the perspective
of bank A,2 with probability  the distribution of returns is the one described above;
with probability 1   , instead, A expects the economy to be in the following state
R = (RA;RB;RC;RD;) = (RL;RH;RH;RH).





RL w. pr. 
RH w. pr. (1   )
(3.17)
The game has the same structure as in the complete information case. First, banks A and
C decide about lending and the interest rate to charge. Then B and D decide to accept
or reject the oer. In case they reject, they have to sell an asset to outside investors to
meet the liquidity demand. We solve the game by backward induction.
Stage 2
We start by deriving the continuation equilibria of the B-D subgame. The information
sets of the two banks are:
T II
B = fRH;RLg T II
D = fRH;RLg
2Given the symmetry of their portfolios, the same analysis applies to bank C. From now on we proceed
through the analysis only considering the problem from A's perspective.
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Consider rst the case in which RC = RL. When B and D resort to outside investors, B's





0 if aB 6= aD or tD = RL
(1 x)
3 (2RL + RH)   aB   (1   )c2; if aB = aD and tD = RH:
(3.18)
D's payos are symmetric.
Whenever B and D miscoordinate, contagion occurs at time 1. The same outcome emerges
when RD = RL. In this case, D has three low-return assets in its portfolio and is forced
into early liquidation according to (3.7). When B and D choose to sell a common asset,
they retain some positive prots at date 2, after the payment of the promised c2 to late
depositors.
The following proposition establishes the equilibria in the B and D subgame
Proposition 7 In B-D game with incomplete information in which the true state of the
world is represented by the vector R = (RL;RH;RL;RH):
 The pure strategies Bayesian Nash Equilibria are (a
B;a
D) 2 f(sell A, sell A),
(sell C, sell C) and (sell B, sell D)g










L = 1 and k is the optimal weight that player
B respectively D puts on playing the pure strategy k 2 fA;B=D;Cg whenever B or
D is of low type3.
Proof. See Appendix.
The equilibria in the incomplete information case are the same as in the complete infor-
mation. The uncertainty about other bank's type does not aects the equilibrium actions.
3Henceforth, low and high type correspond to the case in which bank i's asset has returns Ri =
RL andRi = RH, respectively.
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This is due to the fact that when tD = RL, bank B expects to go bankrupt independently
of the undertaken actions. When tD = RH, the same argument as in the complete infor-
mation applies.
Using the same arguments, we can derive the equilibria in the B and D's subgame in the
state of the economy corresponding to the vector of returns R = fRL;RH;RH;RHg as







B RH  D RH 
Figure 3.3: Distribution of returns corresponding to R = fRL;RH;RH;RHg.
In this case, B's payos are given by
B(tB;tD;aB;aD) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
0 ifaB 6= aD or tD = RL and
aB = aD = sell C
(1 x)
3 (2RH + RL)   ai   (1   )c2; if aB = aD = sell C and tD = RH
if aB = aD = sell A and tD 2 fRH;RLg
(3.19)
Selling two dierent assets causes the bankruptcy of one bank and contagion. Banks expect
to make positive prots when they put on sale a common asset, unless the RD = RL and
they sell C. In this case they expect to be forced into early liquidation and to make zero
prots at date 1.
The equilibria for the B and D subgame are described in the following proposition:
Proposition 8 In B-D game with incomplete information in which the state of the world
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is represented by the vector R = (RL;RH;RH;RH), the pure strategies Bayesian Nash
Equilibria are (a
B;a
D) 2 f(sell A, sell A), (sell C, sell C) and (sell B, sell D)g
Proof. See Appendix.
As in the complete information case, early liquidation emerges as a consequence of banks'
miscoordination. Whenever B and D sell the common asset A, no bank is forced into early
liquidation. However, the occurrence of bankruptcy cannot be only limited to the situation
in which the two banks miscoordinate. B expects to be forced into early liquidation with
probability  when RD = RL and both banks sell asset C. In this state of the economy
corresponding to the vector of return R = (RL;RH;RH;RH), the return on assets A and
C are no longer identical. This means that selling either asset has dierent implications
in terms of probability of going bankrupt as well as on the value of banks' portfolios.
Stage 1
Given the continuation equilibria in the B-D subgame, we move backward to the rst stage
in which banks A and C decide rst upon lending followed by a take-it-or-leave-it interest
rate oer. As stated in Propositions 3 and 4, we have a multiplicity of equilibria in the
continuation game. We focus our analysis on the following:
 Case 1:
{ for R = (RL;RH;RL;RH), A anticipates that B and D will play the mixed
strategy equilibrium as described in Proposition 7.
{ for R = (RL;RH;RH;RH), A anticipates that B and D will play the pure
strategy equilibrium (sell A;sell A) as described in Proposition 23.
 Case 2:
{ for R = (RL;RH;RL;RH), A anticipates that B and D will play the mixed
strategy equilibrium as described in Proposition 7.
{ for R = (RL;RH;RH;RH), A anticipates that B and D will play the pure
strategy equilibrium (sell C;sell C) as described in Proposition 23.
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The type spaces of A and C are :
T II
A = fRL;RHg T II
C = fRL;RHg (3.20)
Analogously to the complete information case, we dene the admissible range [~ rmin; ~ rmax]
in which both borrowers and lenders are willing to participate in a transaction on the
interbank market.
We consider rst the problem of the lender. In order for bank A to provide resources to
a bank in distress, lending must yield higher expected prots.













(2RH + RL) + (x   (1   ))   c2

: (3.21)
Bank A accrues zero prots when the state of the economy is R = (RL;RH;RL;RH) and
B and D miscoordinate. This occurs with probability 
2. Otherwise, bank A is not forced





. A's prots are
given by the return on the investment in the risky projects
(1 x)
3 (2RH + RL) plus the
return (x   (1   )) it obtains investing its excess of liquidity in the safe asset between
date 1 and 2 minus the promised repayment to the late depositors c2. The prots in case





(2RH + RL) + (2x   1) + (   x)~ r   c2: (3.22)
where ~ r 2 [~ rmin; ~ rmax]. Equalizing (3.21) and (3.22) and solving with respect to ~ r we
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It is important to notice that ~ rmin > rmin as dened in (3.15) and (3.23). The intu-
ition is that in the incomplete information case bank A underestimates the probability of
bankruptcy. A expects that, with probability (1 ), RC = RH and bankruptcy does not
emerge in equilibrium. This implies that in the complete information case the lender is
willing to demand a lower interest rate than in the incomplete information framework. In
other words, it is willing to forgo some returns so to prevent B and D from going to the
asset market and miscoordinating with probability 1
2. As  decreases, so that bankruptcy
and contagion become less likely, ~ rmin increases.
Turning to the problem of the borrowers, two dierent ~ rmax must be dened depending
whether RC = RL or RC = RH. We refer to them as ~ rmax
1 and ~ rmax
2 . ~ rmax is the interest
rate that makes the borrowers indierent between borrowing on the interbank market and
selling to investors.
When A expects RC = RL and the continuation equilibrium is the mixed strategy equi-
librium as dened in Proposition 7, then the borrower' s prots 4 are
nb










  (1   )c2

: (3.24)
in case no bank borrows and
b





  (1   )c2   (   x)~ r1

: (3.25)















  (1   )c2

: (3.26)
4We consider bank B but as they have the same portfolios, the same analysis applies to D.
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Symmetrically we nd ~ rmax
2 when A expects RC = RH and the continuation equilibria are





















  (1   )c2

: (3.28)
When the continuation equilibrium is (sell A;sell A), bankruptcy never occurs. This im-
plies that B and D are not willing to pay more than the forgone return
RL(1 x)
3 from
selling the lowest return asset to outside investors. When, instead, the continuation equi-
librium is (sell C;sell C), B and D are willing to pay signicantly more as there is a non
negligible probability, , of going bankrupt in case they do not borrow. This explains why
~ r
max=(CC)
2 > ~ r
max=(AA)
2 .
As in the previous case, it is worth noticing that for  < 1
2, the interest rate rmax as
dened in (3.14) is never lower than the interest rates that make borrowers to break-even
in the incomplete information framework.




2 and ~ r
max=(CC)
2 are ordered. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 9 In equilibrium interbank market freeze occurs when
~ r
max=(CC)
2 > ~ rmin > ~ rmax
1
As consequence, contagion arises in equilibrium with probability 1
2 in the state of the econ-
omy described by the vector of return R = (RL;RH;RL;RH).
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition shows that interbank market freeze occurs in equilibrium when banks
are uncertain about the value of their neighbors' portfolios. When this is the case lenders
Leonello, Agnese (2011), Three Essays in Competition and Banking 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/307193.4. INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 61
A and C underestimate the probability of contagion. This induces them to demand an
excessively high interest rate that borrowers are only willing to accept in the state of
the economy described by R = (RL;RH;RH;RH), in which the borrowers' portfolios
consist of three high return assets. Interbank market freeze emerges in equilibrium for a
suciently small  and suciently high RH.
Uncertainty aects borrowers' willingness to pay. When R = (RL;RH;RL;RH), borrow-
ers attach a high probability to bankruptcy once they resort to the asset market. With
probability , each borrower expects to be forced into early liquidation independently of
the asset sold on the market. Contagion also occurs with probability
(1 )
2 as consequence
of B and D miscoordination. In the state corresponding to R = (RL;RH;RH;RH),
borrowers expect to go bankrupt with probability , that is when the continuation
equilibrium is (sell C;sell C) and the opponent's project returns RL. In this case, lenders
expect that borrowers are willing to pay for a loan more than the forgone return of the
asset they sell to outside investors. A and C have no incentive to demand an interest
rate lower than ~ rmin and they know that borrowers are willing to pay ~ rmax
2 when they
have three high return assets in their portfolio. Thus, the lenders demand in equilibrium
rmax
2 knowing that the bank in distress will reject it in the state of the economy
R = (RL;RH;RL;RH). This thus lead to interbank market freeze and contagion spreads
through all the economy with probability 1
2. This case in which ~ r
max=(CC)
2 > ~ rmin > ~ rmax
1
occurs when  is suciently low and RH suciently high.
In the same parameter space, interbank market freeze would occur when the continuation
equilibrium is (sell A;sell A) as described in Case 1. In the two cases illustrated above,
interbank market freeze is ex post inecient as it may lead to contagion.
Comparison between complete and incomplete information case
Proposition 6 and Proposition 9 state the equilibria of the game under complete and
incomplete information.
Proposition 10 There exists a parameter space in which lending occurs under complete
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information case but not in the game with incomplete information.
The intuition behind proposition 10 is simple. In the complete information case, all
market participants know that bankruptcy occurs with probability 1
2 as consequence of
the miscoordination of B and D. Under incomplete information, borrowers and lenders
attach dierent probabilities to bankruptcy and contagion. In the borrowers' perspective,
in the state of the economy R = (RL;RH;RL;RH), the probability of early liquidation is
1+
2 and  in the state described by the return vector R = (RL;RH;RH;RH). Lenders
expect bankruptcy to arise with probability 
2 when the state of the economy is R =
(RL;RH;RL;RH) and they do not expect to be forced to liquidate their portfolio at
date 1 otherwise. As shown before, this aects their willingness to participate on the
interbank market. Lenders attach lower probability to the event of bankruptcy than
the borrowers. The interest rate that makes the lenders to break-even is higher under
incomplete information than under complete. This means that, ceteris paribus, A and C
are less willing to lend in the incomplete information case.
~ rmin > rmin
In contrast, the interest rate that makes the borrowers to break-even is higher under
incomplete than under complete information, implying that the borrower is willing to
accept a higher interest rate under incomplete information.
~ rmax
1 > rmax
This allows the lender to exploit an informational rent leading him to demand a high in-
terest rate. It anticipates that, in the state R = (RL;RH;RH;RH), the borrower attaches
a positive probability to bankruptcy and, thus, it is willing to pay more in order to avoid
to resort to outside investors. Thus, it exists a parameter space in which
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Complete information Incomplete information
rmax > rmin ~ r
max=(CC)
2 > ~ rmin > ~ rmax
1
Due to the uncertainty on the realization of the return on the asset they do not hold, lenders
underestimate the probability of contagion and expect to be able to extract informational
rents from the borrowers in the state R = (RL;RH;RH;RH). For a low , this induces
lenders to behave greedily and to nd it optimal to choose ~ r
max=(CC)




1 , the loan oer will be turned down in state R = (RL;RH;RL;RH) and interbank
market freeze occurs. Figure 4 illustrates the proposition by showing the banks lending
I I






Figure 3.4: Interbank market freeze in complete and incomplete information case.
decisions under complete and incomplete information as function of the return RH and
the probability of a low return . Lending is not observed in equilibrium either under
complete or incomplete information in region I. In region II, lending occurs in the complete
information case but not in the incomplete one while in region III, lending occurs under
both complete and incomplete information.
The complete information case corresponds to the horizontal line  = 1. In that scenario,
lending occurs only for a suciently high RH, RH > R
H. As RH increases, banks are
more willing to participate on the interbank market. The interest rate rmax, as dened in
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This is due to the fact that the borrower's forgone prots, when forced to liquidate its













Under incomplete information, the solid line represents all the combination of RH and
 for which ~ rmin = ~ r
max=(CC)
1 . On the left of the solid line, where ~ rmin > ~ r
max=(CC)
1 ,
lending does not occur. When uncertainty is introduced in the model,  6= 1, banks are
less willing to lend than under complete information (Region II). Lenders underestimate
the probability of contagion for any  6= 1 and this implies that they have less incentive
to lend. For them to be willing to lend, RH must to be suciently high. When this is
the case they expect to incur high losses in case of bankruptcy at date 1. For the same
reasons, lenders expect borrowers to be willing to give up a larger amount of resources to
obtain the loans and, thus, to be able to extract larger rent in the state of the economy
in which the borrowers' portfolio consists of three high return assets (i.e. RC = RH):
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3.5 An example
To illustrate the consequences of uncertainty on interbank market transactions and con-
tagion we consider a numerical example with the following parameters:




0:5 w. pr. 0:05
1:5 w. pr. 0:95
; c2 = 1:01; x = 0:5454;  = 1:155:
At date 1, bank B and D have a shortage of liquidity (   x) = 0:0700 while banks A
and C' s excess of liquidity is given by (x (1 )) = 0:3299. In case B and D decide to





= 0:46236 < RL = 0:5: (3.29)
The price P is lower than the lowest return. This capture the idea of re sale prices
and implies that only banks with a shortage of liquidity eventually sell an asset to outside
investors. Given the price P, RL and RH as dened above, the bankruptcy rules as dened
in (3.7) and (3.8) hold
x + [RL + RL + RL]
(1   x)
3




No bank, instead, is forced into early liquidation at date 1 when only one asset is sold to
investors. In this case, even when only one asset returns RH at date 2, the market value
of bank's portfolio is
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When no transaction occurs on the interbank market, the two banks in distress sell an
asset to the outside investors. One equilibrium in the B-D game is the mixed strategy
equilibrium in which banks miscoordinate and sell two dierent asset with probability 0.5.







  (1   )c2

= 0:00003






[2RH + RL] + (2x   1) + (   x)   c2

= 0:1022:
for A and C. The interest rates that make a bank in distress indierent between borrowing
or not and a lender indierent between lending or not are, respectively
rmax = 1:0818 and rmin =  0:304
The negative interest rate rmin means that it is always protable for the lender to lend.
Therefore, lending always occurs in the complete information case.
Incomplete Information Case
Bank A does not observe the return on bank's project RC. It expects RC = 0:5 with
probability  = 0:05. In case bank A expects this, it anticipates that in equilibrium banks
B and D miscoordinate and sell two dierent assets with probability 0:5. In this case
it expects to be forced into early liquidation and to earn zero prots. When, instead,
A expects RC = 1:5, then it anticipates that in case no transaction takes place on the
interbank market, both B and D would optimally choose to sell their shares of asset C. In
this case, no bank is forced into early liquidation and makes positive prots. For bank A
to be willing to lend then the interest rate should be such that, by lending, it would make
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(2RH + RL) + (2x   1) + (   x)   c2

= 0:1993:
Thus, the minimum interest rate bank A is willing to charge is ~ rmin = 1:08205. Unlike, the
complete information, lending is not always protable. This depends on the fact that the
probability of being forced into early liquidation is 
2 = 0:025 < 0:5. The lender expect,
instead, borrowers to attach probabilities 
2 = 0:525 and  = 0:05 to bankruptcy when
RC = RL and RC = RH, respectively. As early liquidation and contagion are less likely
in the incomplete information case than under complete information, lenders have more
bargaining power so that the lowest interest rate at which they are willing to lend is higher
than the one in the complete information case.
Uncertainty also changes the value of the alternative funding opportunity for the borrow-
ers. Bank A anticipates that, depending on the realized return on the share of asset C















  (1   )c2

= 1:0818


















when RC = 1:5. Given
~ r
max=(CC)
2 > ~ rmin > ~ rmax
1 = rmax > rmin
lending occurs in the complete information case but not in the incomplete information
one. Banks A and C demand the interest rate ~ r
max=(CC)
2 and B and D reject the lender's
oer when RC = 0:5. In that case, interbank market freeze may induce contagion as,
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with probability 0:5, banks miscoordinate selling two dierent assets when they resort to
outside investors to meet their liquidity demand. In this circumstance, all banks are forced
into early liquidation and earn zero prots.
It can be easily shown that, in the same parameter space, lending does not occur also
when the considered equilibrium in the B-D subgame when RC = 1:5 is (sell A;sell A)
instead of (sell C;sell C) we have just focused on. In this case, the admissible range for















  (1   )c2

= 1:0818



























~ rmin > ~ r
max=(AA)
2 > ~ rmax
1 = rmax > rmin
no transaction takes place on the interbank market. This implies that, when RC = 0:5,
contagion may occurs as consequence of interbank market freeze. However, as before the
interbank market freeze is a consequence of the uncertainty on the counterparty risk. In
the rst case, interbank market freeze occurs because lenders and borrowers have dier-
ent perceived probabilities of bankruptcy. Lenders expect borrowers to attach a higher
probability to bankruptcy. This prompt a "greedy" behavior of the lenders resulting in
the demand of an excessively high interest rate. In the second case, instead, lending does
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not occur as it is not protable. The lender anticipates that as, bankruptcy never occurs
when RC = 1:5, the borrowers are not willing to accept any protable (for the lender)
interest rate.
3.6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have developed a simple model where banks can borrow on the interbank
market to meet their uncertain liquidity demands. Alternatively they can resort to the
asset markets selling the assets at re sale price. The intertwining of re sale prices
and mark-to-market accounting may trigger a wave of bankruptcies and a systemic
failure. We have shown that, despite the risk of contagion, banks may not nd it
optimal to participate on the interbank market. This occurs when banks do not have
complete information about the distribution of returns in the economy. Under incomplete
information lenders underestimate the risk of contagion and expect banks in distress to
be willing to pay higher interest rate than the one that makes them indierent between
borrowing and selling the asset. Thus, lenders demand an excessively high interest rate
that borrowers reject. Due to this greedy behavior of the lenders, interbank market freeze
occurs and this may lead to contagion with positive probability.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5
We start from the derivation of the pure strategy Nash equilibria.
If banks B and D sell two dierent assets, all banks in the economy are forced into early
liquidation and earn zero prots as the market value of bank's assets Vi is lower than the
value of bank's liabilities at date 1 as stated in (3.8). In the cases, instead, both banks
sell either asset A or C, no bank will go bankrupt at date 1. As assets A and C have the
same return at date 2, we can only focus on one of the two cases (i.e. they sell asset A),
without loss of generality. When asset A is sold on the market, the market value of banks'
portfolio becomes:
 VA = (P + RH + RH)
(1 x)
3 + x > 1
 VB = (P + RH + RL)
(1 x)
3 + x > 1
 VC = (2RH + RL)
(1 x)
3 + x > 1
 VD = (P + RH + RL)
(1 x)
3 + x > 1.
and no bank is forced into early liquidation. Thus, B and D's prots at date 2 are:
B = D = (RH + RL)
(1   x)
3
  (1   )c2 > 0 (3.33)
and the pure strategy Nash equilibria are as in the proposition.
Regarding the mixed strategy equilibrium. Selling its own asset is for both B and D
a weakly dominated strategy as banks accrue zero prots independently of the action
chosen by the other bank in distress. As the game is symmetric for both B and D, to
derive the mixed strategy equilibrium we can only consider one of the two (say B). Dene
(p;q;1   p   q) as the probabilities B attaches to D playing actions (sell A;sell C;sell D),






  (1   )c2

+ q  0 + (1   p   q)  0: (3.34)
The payos from selling B are
p  0 + q  0 + (1   p   q)  0 (3.35)
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and those from selling C are





  (1   )c2

+ (1   p   q)  0: (3.36)





















The same analysis applies to D and the proposition holds.
Proof of Proposition 6
We solve the A-C game by backwards induction. After the rst stage of the A-C game, four
outcomes are possible: A and C have chosen to oer a loan to the same bank (henceforth
the competition case), A and C have decided to make oers to dierent banks, each holding
monopoly power in the bargaining process (the monopolist case 1), only one bank (A or
C) makes an oer while the other bank withholds (the monopolist case 2) and no bank
makes an oer (non-lending case).
To prove the proposition, we have to distinguish three possible intervals.
1. rmin < RL
1 x
3( x) <  < rmax
(a) The competition case
When A and C are both oering a loan to the same bank, they compete  a la





C )=(;). Oering  is a weakly dominant strategy. Any deviation
from this interest rate, would ensure its rejection from the side of the borrower.
Since the borrower is indierent between the oers, each oer is accepted with
probability 1









[2RH + RL] + (2x   1)






(b) The monopolist case 1
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Without loss of generality, assume that A makes an oer to B and C makes an
oer to D. The equilibrium interest rate at this stage is not straightforward. The
rst guess would be to assume that whenever lenders have monopolistic power,
they will be able to extract the whole surplus from the borrower, requesting
rmax. In the simultaneous decision game of B and D, only one oer is accepted,
as, given that one of the banks accepts, the other is better o rejecting the
take-it-or-leave-it oer. Resorting to outside investors, the bank would give up
only RL
(1 x)
3 < (   x)rmax of his future prots. Moreover, conditional on





3 < (   x), as in this case, conditional
on bank D having accepted the C's take-it-or-leave-it oer rmax, bank A will
always nd it optimal not to oer anything lower or equal to . Hence, the
equilibrium interest rates of this stage are: (l;rmax), with l 2 ]RL
(1 x)
3( x);1[.
In equilibrium, only one oer is accepted.
In the equilibrium in which C's oer rmax to D is accepted, and any oer above
RL
(1 x)







[2RH + RL] + (2x   1)







[2RH + RL] + (2x   1)

+ (   x)rmax   c2: (3.41)
(c) The monopolist case 2
In the case in which there is only one lender making an oer, the bargaining
power is entirely on the lender's side. The lender is able to appropriate the
entire surplus from the borrower. Hence, the equilibrium interest rates at this
stage are: (rmax;;). In the equilibrium in which A is the lender and C has






[2RH + RL] + (2x   1)








[2RH + RL] + (2x   1)

+ (   x)   c2: (3.43)
(d) The non lending case
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[2RH + RL] + (x   (1   ))   c2

(3.45)
Bank A and C's payos described above can be easily ordered as follows:
nl < liq < mon
Under these circumstance, the A-C game has ve subgame perfect Nash Equilibria:
 f(lend to D;lend to D);(;)g
 f(lend to D;lend to B);(rmax;l)gwithl 2 ]RL
(1 x)
3( x);1[
 f(lend to B;lend to D);(l;rmax)gwithl 2 ]RL
(1 x)
3( x);1[
 f(lend to D;non lending);(rmax;;)g
 f(non lending;lend to D);(;;rmax)g
2. rmin <  < RL
1 x
3( x) < rmax
(a) The competition case
As long as  < rmax, the potential lenders will always compete  a la Bertrand.
The result of this stage remains unchanged compared to the previous stage.















[2RH + RL] + (2x   1)





(b) The monopolist case 1
Assume now that A decides to lend to B and C to D. As argued before,
only one borrower will accept rmax. Let this borrower be B. When B ac-





3 > (   x), C's best reply to A's successful oer rmax is to oer
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RL
(1 x)





3( x);rmax)g and both oers are accepted.
Assuming that the equilibrium at the interest rate stage is (rmax;RL
(1 x)
3( x)),
















(c) The monopolist case 2
As in the previous case, when only one bank lends, it is able to appropriate
the entire surplus and thus charge the borrower rmax. The equilibrium interest











[2RH + RL] + (2x   1) + (   x)   c2 (3.50)
Bank A and C's payos described above can be easily ordered as follows:





Under these circumstance, the A-C game has two subgame perfect Nash Equilibria:
 f(lend to D;lend to B);(rmax;RL
(1 x)
3( x))g





3( x) < rmax < rmin < 
In this case the analysis is much simpler than in the previous ones. As rmin >
rmax, there is not protable interest rate for the lender that will be accepted by the
borrower. Thus, no transaction take ever place on the interbank market.
The proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 7
The proof is similar to the one we derive in the complete information case. We start from
the derivation of the pure strategy Nash equilibria. Given the symmetry between B and
D's portfolios, we derive the equilibrium only from the perspective of B.
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If banks B and D sell two dierent assets, all banks in the economy are forced into early
liquidation and earn zero prots independently of the D's type. In the cases, instead, both
banks sell either asset A or C, no bank will go bankrupt at date 1 unless B expects D to
have a low asset: RD = RL. With probability , D has a portfolio comprising three low
assets and, according to (3.7), it is forced into early liquidation.
When B and D sell the same asset and B expects RD = RH, the market values of banks'
portfolios are:
 VA = (P + RH + RH)
(1 x)
3 + x > 1
 VB = (P + RH + RL)
(1 x)
3 + x > 1
 VC = (2RH + RL)
(1 x)
3 + x > 1
 VD = (P + RH + RL)
(1 x)
3 + x > 1.
and no bank is forced into early liquidation. When coordinating B and D's expected prots
at date 2 are:





  (1   )c2

> 0: (3.51)
Deviating from selling a common asset triggers the immediate bankruptcy of at least one
bank and through the dynamics induced by mark-to-market accounting, all banks will
go bankrupt at date 1. Putting on sale a common asset is a weakly dominant strategy.
(sell A;sell A) and (sell C;sell C) emerge therefore as payo dominant Bayesian Nash
equilibria.
The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (sell B;sell D) arises as a payo dominated equilibrium.
When either bank sells its own asset early liquidation occurs independently of what the
opponent decides to sell.
We now derive the mixed strategy equilibrium.
Selling its own asset is for both B and D a weakly dominated strategy as players accrue
zero prots independently of the action chosen by the other bank in distress and its
type.From the perspective of bank B the game develops as follows.
Dene (p;q;1   p   q) and (~ p; ~ q;1   ~ p   ~ q) as the probabilities B attaches to D playing
actions (sell A;sell C;sell D) when RD = RH and RD = RL, respectively. Bank B's
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payo from selling A are








  (1   )c2









  (1   )c2

:
The payos from selling B are
  [~ p  0 + ~ q  0 + (1   ~ p   ~ q)  0]+
+(1   )[p  0 + q  0 + (1   p   q)  0] = 0
and those from selling C are
  [~ p  0 + ~ q  0 + (1   ~ p   ~ q)  0]+
+(1   )






  (1   )c2

+ (1   p   q)  0

=





  (1   )c2

:





















The same analysis applies to D and, thus, the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 23
As in the case RC = RL, when B and D sell two dierent assets they are forced into
early liquidation together with all the other banks in the economy. There is another
circumstance in which banks earn zero prots: when the rival bank is expected to have a
low return asset and banks sell asset C. The expected payo of B and D in case they sell
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A is instead given by:





  (1   )c2

> 0: (3.54)
In case banks B and D coordinate on selling asset C, the expected payos are





  (1   )c2

> 0: (3.55)
Thus, the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 9 We proceed as in the proof of Proposition 6. We solve the
A-C game by backward induction. After the rst stage of the A-C game, four outcomes
are possible: A and C have chosen to oer a loan to the same bank (henceforth the
competition case), A and C have decided to make oers to dierent banks, each holding
monopoly power in the bargaining process(the monopolist case 1), only one bank (A or
C) makes an oer while the other bank withholds (the monopolist case 2) and no bank
makes an oer (non-lending case).
We start our proof by showing that whenever ~ rmin < ~ rmax
1 , we observe lending in both
scenarios, which will prevent bankruptcy and contagion.
1. The competition case
When A and C oer a loan to the same bank, they compete  a la Bertrand. The oers
made by the two lenders in equilibrium depend on the return on investment in the
safe asset between date one and two, relative to ~ rmax
1 . We rst consider  < ~ rmax
1 . In
this parameter space, the Bertrand-type competition will drive both interest rates
down to . In contrast, when  > ~ rmax
1 , lenders will make dierentiated oers in
which only one of them proposes ~ rmax
1 , while the other one will charge anything above
this level. The lowest interest is going to be accepted in both scenarios and since
there is going to be only one bank liquidating an asset, bankruptcy and contagion
are prevented.
2. The monopolist case 1
When lenders make oers to dierent banks, at least one lender will oer ~ rmax
1 . It
is easy to prove that the situation in which both lenders' oers are strictly higher
than ~ rmax
1 cannot be part of an equilibrium.. Whenever both interest rates oered
are above the ~ rmax
1 threshold, both oers will be rejected in the true state of the
economy (RC = RL) and only one of them will be accepted in the alternative state
of the economy. Anticipating this equilibrium actions on the side of the borrowers,
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the lender who expects its oer to be rejected in both states realizes the same prot
as in the non-lending case. Since we are under the assumption ~ rmin < ~ rmax
1 , this
lender nds a protable deviation in the range

~ rmin; ~ rmax
1

. It must be then the
case that at least one of the oers made is less or equal to the threshold value ~ rmax
1 .
This implies that at least one loan oer is accepted in equilibrium.
3. The monopolist case 2
In the case in which there is only one lender making an oer, the bargaining power is
entirely on the lender's side. The lender is able to appropriate the entire surplus from
the borrower. Hence, the equilibrium interest rates at this stage are either (~ rmax
2 ;;)
or (~ rmax
1 ;;). The lender chooses ~ rmax
2 instead of ~ rmax
1 , if the prots it accrues in the














(2RH + RL) + (   x)~ rmax






[2RH + RL] + (2x   1)

+ (   x)~ rmax
1   c2
The left hand side are the prots the lender accrues when it demands ~ rmax
2 , while
the right hand side are the prots in case it chooses ~ rmax
1 . When the condition (3.56)
holds one lender oers rmax
2 and the oer is rejected in the true state of the economy.

















(2RH + RL) + (   x)~ rmax





4. Non lending case
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[2RH + RL] + (x   (1   ))   c2

(3.58)
On the one hand, in both the competition and monopoly case 1 lending always occurs
in equilibrium. On the other hand, it can never be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium a
situation in which only one bank makes an oer r > ~ rmax
1 , as shown in the monopolist
case 1.
Now we turn our attention to the case in which ~ rmax
1 < ~ rmin. Here we distinguish two
cases:
1. When ~ rmax
2 < ~ rmin the same analysis applies as in the case rmin > rmax under
complete information. As ~ rmin is higher than the maximum interest rate borrowers
are willing to pay in both states of the economy, no lending will take place. Thus,
contagion arises in equilibrium with positive probability.
2. When ~ rmax
1 < ~ rmin < ~ rmax
2
(a) The competition case
The equilibrium interest rate is (;). This oer is going to be accepted only
in the case both lenders expect the other lender to have a high return asset.
No bank has an incentive to understate this oer, as oering ~ rmax
1 yields less
expected prots than under non-lending. Overstating yields the same prot as
the the equilibrium.
(b) The monopolist case 1
In equilibrium, one bank oers ~ rmax
2 and this oer is accepted while the other
bank's oer is always rejected. The equilibrium of this subgame is: (~ rmax
2 ;l)
where l 2]~ rmax
1 ;1[. In the state of the economy in which A expects RC = RH,
the only oer accepted is ~ rmax
2 , while in the true state of the economy borrowers
reject the oer.
(c) The monopolist case 2
The only lender demands in equilibrium an interest rate ~ rmax
2 which is rejected
in the true state of the economy and accepted in the other state. It does not
exist a protable interest rate for the lender that will be accepted in both states.
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The prots can easily be ordered:
mon1 = mon2 > nl
In equilibrium only one oer is accepted and only in the state of the economy de-
scribed by R = (RL;RH;RH;RH).
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Horizontal Mergers in Two-Sided
Markets
4.1 Introduction
The interest in two-sided markets has grown in the last decade. There are many markets, in
several dierent industries, that are two or multi sided. Two-sided platforms are common
in traditional industries (i.e. supermarket, credit card, video games) as well as in new-
economy industries (operating system producers, web portals) and advertising supported
media (newspapers, radio, TV) (Rysman, 2009).
Although type-specic features can be detected, there are common attributes identifying
a two-sided market. First, there exist two or more distinct customer groups that want to
interact with each other but, due to transaction costs, they need a platform that allows
and facilitates their interaction. Second, the platform internalizes the indirect network
externalities between the groups and allows the members of the two groups to capture the
benets from having access to each other. This has relevant consequences on the pricing
decisions, as well as on other platforms' strategic choices. The volume of transactions does
not only depend on the aggregate price level, as it is the case in one-sided markets, but
it is crucially aected by the price structure (how the price is allocated between the two
sides of the market).
All these features are summarized in the following denition minted by Rochet and Tirole
(2004):
83
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"A market is two-sided if the platform can aect the volume of transactions by charging
more to one side of the market and reducing the price paid by the other side by an equal
amount; in other words the price structure matters, and platforms must design it so as to
bring both sides on board"
In other words, pricing their goods, platforms have to take into account that raising
the price on one side of the market implies, as usual, a reduction in the number of the
consumers served on that side. However, the total eect is much broader: due to the
indirect network externalities, the decrease in demand implies a further decrease in the
demand on the other side and this proceeds iteratively from one side of the market to the
other, generating a feedback loop.
In the last few years, several mergers between two-sided platforms took place in dier-
ent industries. For example, the newspaper industry has seen an increased concentration
as consequence of several mergers, in several countries. This has contributed to an increase
in interest in this topic among practitioners and antitrust authorities.1 Nonetheless, there
has been very little work examining the eects of mergers in two-sided markets.
In this paper, I analyze the eects of a merger between two platforms on consumers'
welfare. I show that, under some conditions, a merger between two-sided platforms is not
only protable for platforms but it is also benecial for consumers.
The possibility of having welfare-enhancing mergers is due to the fact that platforms
internalize the eects that a change in prices has on the demand for both products on
both sides of the markets. After the merger, the two-sided platforms face a trade o. On
one hand, they would like to increase prices because of the lower competition. On the
other hand, indirect network externalities create an incentive for keeping the price low,
at least on one side of the market, to induce an increase in demand on the other side of
the market and get higher revenue on the inframarginal units. When indirect network
1Recently, the OFT was seeking views and advice in order to revise the merger regime regarding local
and regional printed media. The need of a review came after several cases regarding mergers between local
and regional newspapers that OFT investigated in the last few years. The Dutch antitrust authority also
recently commissioned a study on mergers in two-sided markets.
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externalities are suciently high, the latter eect dominates the former. In this case, the
platforms' pricing strategy positively aects consumers' surplus. The crux of the analysis
is to evaluate which eect dominates.
This result contrasts sharply with traditional merger analysis performed in one-sided mar-
kets. In traditional industries, in case of price competition (strategic complements), merg-
ers are welfare-detrimental as they only cause an increase in price due to the lower compe-
tition. The opposite result (a merger is welfare-enhancing) may be obtained if the merger
entails eciency gains.2
The paper is related to various others. Evans and Noel (2007) show how the traditional
techniques used to analyze the eects of mergers are biased if applied to the two-sided
market case. They, thus, modify the traditional techniques in order to incorporate the two-
sided nature of these markets and apply them to the analysis of the merger between Google
and Doubleclick. The closest paper to mine is a paper by Chandra and Wexler (2009).
They develop a model to study the eects of a merger in the newspaper industry and test
the predictions using data relative to the mergers between Canadian newspapers. They
show that the eects of the merger on consumers' welfare are ambiguous. The merger may
lead to lower prices on either side of the market under specic circumstances. A necessary
condition for the merged platforms to charge a lower price is that the newspaper is sold
at a price below marginal cost to readers. Their result depends on specic assumptions
of the model. The main dierence with my paper is that they assume that there is price
competition only on one side of the market. This implies that the merger does not have a
direct eect on the price on that side. It only indirectly aects the price through the change
in the number of consumers patronizing the platform on the other side of the market.
This assumption has important implications for the results. They nd that, depending
on the circumstances, the prices increase or decrease on both sides of the market, while
in my paper, the post-merger price on the side of the market where the indirect network
2See Deneckere and Davidson (1985) for the analysis of mergers when rms compete in prices (strategic
complements).
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externalities are the highest, always increases after the merger.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The pre-merger equilib-
rium is derived in Section 3. Section 4 presents the post-merger equilibrium and compares
the pre- and post-merger equilibria. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 The Model
The model is based on D'Aspremont and Motta (1994) and Armstrong (2006). Consider
a market with two competing platforms, A and B. Each platform serves two groups of
consumers (or sides), 1 and 2, and it enables them to interact. For example, an operating
system producer (Windows, Apple etc.) is a platform serving both clients and application
developers. Similarly, credit cards (Visa, MasterCard, Amex etc.) deal with both card-
holders and merchants and newspapers serve both readers and advertisers.
A real line represents each side of the market. Platforms A and B are located in 0 and
1, respectively. For simplicity, I assume that the locations are xed before and after the
merger. This means that the choice of the products is taken as given by the platforms.





on each side of the market. Denote with nk
i the number of consumers served by
platform k, with k = A; B, on the side i of the market. The convexity of the cost function
ensures the concavity of the prot function.
Consumers have an inelastic demand. Each of them buys one unit of the good if the price
is less than their reservation value, zero otherwise. On each side of the market, there is
single-homing. This means that consumers can join only one platform.
The utility of a consumer on side i joining platform k is
uk
i = S + ink
j   pk
i   tixi
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8 i = 1;2 and k = A;B: Consumer' s utility is given by net value the consumer attaches
to the good S pk
i  tixi plus the benet ink
j the consumer derives from the fact that there
are nk
j agents patronizing the platform on the other side of the market. The net surplus
he/she obtains from buying the good is given, in turn, by the dierence between the
intrinsic value of the good S, with S > 0, the price pk
i and the transportation costs tixi.
As in the traditional Hotelling model, tixi can be interpreted as the physical distance
or, alternatively, it may represent a measure of the implicit cost to the consumer from
purchasing a good deviating from his "ideal" product. For simplicity, unit transportation
costs are normalized to one on both sides. Thus,
t1 = t2 = 1:
The term ink
j measures the indirect network externalities. An additional consumer
patronizing platform k on side j induces an increase in side i consumers' utility exactly
equal to i, with i  0
Throughout the analysis, I assume, for simplicity, that 1 = 0 and 2 > 0. Recall that
the main idea of the paper is to show that in a two-sided markets a merger may be welfare
enhancing, because of the indirect network externalities. Thus, the higher they are, the
larger are the incentives for the platform to keep the price relatively low. Therefore,
setting 1 = 0 is a conservative assumption that does not aect the results. With any
1 > 0 the results would be even stronger. Moreover, this assumption is consistent with
the newspaper market. Newspapers are two-sided platforms. On one side there are the
readers, on the other the advertisers. Unlike advertisers, readers do not usually attach
any value to the presence of advertising on the newspaper. Readers, as well as advertisers,
do not represent a homogeneous group; for example, they can be distinguished on the
basis of their political connotation: moving from the left to the right of the line, we have
left-wing activists, centrist and right-wingers. Another possible source of heterogeneity is
geographic location. In this case, the two platforms would represent two local newspapers
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for neighboring towns.
On each side of the market, platforms serve two groups of consumers: each platform
supplies potential consumers on its left and those on its right (Figure 1). Therefore,
on each side, three segments can be distinguished: the interval [0;1] and two wings.3
Platforms cannot price discriminate. They charge the same price to all consumers on
each side of the market.
Figure 4.1: The market with overlapping market areas
On the wings, the platforms always enjoy the position of local monopoly, but, in
the interval [0;1], depending on the value of S and i, the platform can either enjoy a
position of local monopoly or it can share that segment with the rival rm. I dene below
the constraints on the parameters such that, on each side of the market, the interval
[0;1] is always covered. The case in which platforms' market areas do not overlap is not
very interesting as in that case, the post-merger platform's maximizing strategy would be
exactly the same as in the pre-merger situation.
Dene ~ nk
i and  nk
i as the demand when the platform enjoys a position of local monopoly
3From now on, I dene wings the segments, on each side, that are on the platform A's left side and on
platform B' s right, respectively.
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and when it competes with its rival, respectively.
On the wings, the demand depends only on the price pk
i chosen by the platform and the
gross surplus S + ink
j. It can be derived as follows
~ nk
i = S + ink
j   pk
i (4.1)
8i = 1;2 and k = A;B.











8i = 1;2 and k = A;B.
Platform k's total demand on each side of the market is given by the sum of (4.1) and

























On side 1, the demand depends only on the prices charged by the two platforms on that
Leonello, Agnese (2011), Three Essays in Competition and Banking 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/3071990 4. HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS
side of the market. On side 2, instead, the demand depends also on the prices that the two
platforms charge on the other side of the market. The lower the price a platform charges
to consumers on side 1, the larger the number of consumers patronize that platform and
thus the larger is the demand on side 2.
4.3 Pre-Merger Equilibrium
Before the merger, the platforms compete in prices on each side of the market. The
platforms' problem consists of choosing simultaneously the prices. Platforms choose prices































The platforms' prots are given by the sum of the prots on each side of the market.





































The equilibrium variables, as dened in Proposition 11 are consistent with the two-
sided market literature. The size of the indirect network externalities aects the platforms'
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32 + 24 + 52
2(32   52)
2
It is always negative. This means that as the indirect network externalities increase,
platforms optimally choose to lower the price on side 1 so to attract more consumers.
Doing so, they can to extract a larger share of consumers' surplus on side 2. Thus, as the




















and it is always positive for any value of 2 and S. As the indirect network externalities
increase, it becomes optimal for the platform to reduce the price on side 1 so to attract
more consumers. This in turn increase consumers' gross surplus S + 2n1 on side 2; thus,
allowing the platform to charge a higher price on that side of the market.
Moreover, the price on side 1 is negative for high value of the network externalities.
This is the case for





This means that, for large enough network externalities, platforms have an incentive to
give the good out for free to the consumers on side 1 in order to attract more consumers
on the other side and charge them a higher price. This strategy implies that side 1 is
subsidized with the prots the platforms make on the other side. Such a situation is
common in the newspaper industry. Some newspapers are given for free to the readers
and newspapers only make prots from the advertisers' side.
In order for the equilibrium described in Proposition 11 to be an equilibrium, it must
be that prots  and quantities n
1 and n
2 are non negative. Moreover, we have also to
check that the equilibrium described in Proposition 11 is consistent with the assumption
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that platforms' market areas overlap on both sides of the market. The following result
holds.
Proposition 12 In the equilibrium described in Proposition 11 platforms have overlapping
market areas on each side of the market. Such an equilibrium exists for any S > 13
6 and
0 < 2 < 2:10.
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, I compute the pre-merger consumers' welfare. This is equal to the sum of
the consumers' surplus on side 1 and that on side 2 patronizing both platforms. The two























2 + x   1)dx (4.7)
with z and w are the marginal consumers on the wings on side 1 and 2, respectively.
In each of the two expressions above, the st integral represents the utility of consumers
lying in the interval [0;1], while the second one is that of agents being on the wings.
4.4 Post-Merger Equilibrium
To focus on the role of indirect network externalities, I assume that no eciency gains
result from the merger. I also assume that platforms' locations do not change, meaning
that, after the merger, platforms continue to supply the same products as before.
I model the merger as a non-consolidating merger. This means that the number of active
platforms does not change. The only dierence between the pre- and post-merger situation
is that, post-merger, the merging platforms become a single entity in the negotiation
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with the consumers on both sides of the market. The assumption of a non-consolidating
merger is convenient for the newspaper case. Mergers between newspapers are usually
non-consolidating mergers. In this industry, a merger often results in an editorial group
printing dierent newspapers.
A non-consolidating merger captures the same eects of a consolidating merger reducing
the number of active platforms on the market. One eect refers to the market power of
the merged entity: it increases as a consequence of the lower competition. The other eect
is the increase in the potential number of consumers patronizing the platforms and, thus,
in the potential value of joining the platform and in the price they can charge. To capture
such eect in the framework of a non-consolidating merger, I assume that the new entity
oers consumers the possibility to interact with the customers patronizing either platform
on the other side of the market. The merged platforms have an incentive to do so as
they can increase consumers' reservation value and, thus, the price they can charge on the
market.
Referring to the newspaper example, this can be implemented by the newly merged
entity oering a bundle to advertisers: independently of the platform they patronize,
advertisers can place advertising on both newspapers. This allows advertisers to have
access to all the agents patronizing either platform. In other industries, this assumption
would represent the introduction of compatibility between the platforms' products.
The introduction of compatibility/ sale bundle of advertising captures the increase
in the number of potential consumers on each side of the market and thus the potential
increase in the value of joining the platform.
Considering the newspaper case, an increase in the number of readers that an advertiser
can reach implies an increase in the gross surplus of advertisers and this allows platforms
to charge a higher price.
In this framework, it is reasonable to think that consumers do not attach the same value
to the agents joining the two platforms on the other side of the market. In the newspapers
example, advertisers do not attach the same value to all the readers but value dierently
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the readers depending on the newspaper they read. Reasonably, advertisers attach a higher
value to the readers buying the newspaper closer to their original platform.
A new parameter , with 0    1, is introduced into the model. It represents the
weight the consumers on side 2 attach to the consumers patronizing a dierent platform
on side 1. The utility of a consumer on side 2 joining platform k is now
uk




8 i = 1;2 and k = A;B.
The utility of a consumer on side 1 is the same as before. As in the pre merger equilibrium,
the demand functions can be derived as follows
nk
1 =








(1 + 2S)(1 + 2(1 + )) + (p k
2   3pk
2) + 2(3   5)p k




8k = A;B on side 1 and 2, respectively.
As in the pre-merger case, the platforms' problem consists of choosing the price to charge
on each side of the market. Merged platforms choose the price in order to maximize their
joint prots. Platforms' prots are now given by the sum of the prots of the two platforms
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Unlike in the pre merger equilibrium, there are now two eects that merged platforms
trade o when they choose the prices. On one hand, they would like to increase the price
on both side of the market because of lower competition. On the other hand, there is also
a stronger incentive to keep the price lower at least on one side of the market than in the
pre merger case due to indirect network externalities. After the merger, the number of
potential consumers increases and thus the value of joining the platforms. Referring to
the newspaper example, the merged platforms have an incentive to lower the price on the
readers' side in order to attract more of them and thus being able to charge a higher price
to the advertisers. In equilibrium the two eects balance. The following results hold.















2(3 2(1+)) consumers on side 1 and 2. The equilibrium prots are M =
(1+2S)2
4(3 2(1+)).
As in the pre merger equilibrium, the price on side 1 is a decreasing function of the
externality parameter 2 while the price charged to side 2 consumers is increasing in 2.
The larger , the larger the magnitude of the two eects.
@pM
1









 (1 + 2S)(1 + )
2(3   2(1 + ))2





(1 + 2S)(1 + )
(3   2(1 + ))2
is always positive for any S > 0 and 2 > 0.
The higher the network externalities parameter on side 2, the lower the price the merged
platforms set on side 1. Below I check that in the admissible parameters space, as dened
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in Proposition 12, the merger is protable, the post merger equilibrium quantities are
positive and platforms' market areas overlap.
I start considering the protability of the merger. For the merger to take place it must
be that
M   (4.11)
As the post merger prots increase with , to prove that the merger is protable it is
enough to show that platforms have incentive to merge even if  = 0. Substituting the
expressions for M and , as in Propositions 11 and 13 and choosing  = 0, the condition
(4.11) simplies to
128 + 1442 + 612
2 + 92
3
32(3   2)(32   52
2) 2 (1 + 2S)2 > 0 (4.12)
which is always positive for any admissible 2 and S. As in the pre-merger equilibrium,
it must be the case that platforms have overlapping market areas after the merger. For













where (4.13) and (4.13) state that the marginal consumer in the interval [0;1], on both
sides of the market, is willing to buy the good from either platform.
Substituting the expressions for the equilibrium quantities and prices as dened in
Proposition 13, both inequalities (4.13) and (4.14) simplify to
2S + 22(1 + )   5
2(3   2(1 + ))
(4.15)
which is positive for S > 5
2, 2 in the admissible parameter space and 3
7    1.
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Given the characterization of the pre- and post-merger equilibrium, the next step is to
show that the merger may be welfare enhancing.
Unlike in the one-sided markets, in the two-sided one, platforms face a trade o after the
merger. On one hand, they would like to increase the price because of weaker competition;
on the other, they have an incentive to keep the price low so to benet from the indirect
network externalities. The bundle sales of advertising/ compatibility reinforces this eects.
Therefore, whether the merger is welfare enhancing or not depends only on the parameters
2 and . To evaluate the welfare properties of the merger, it is important to compare
pre- and post-merger prices and quantities. The results of the comparison between the
pre and post-merger equilibria are summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 14 Given _  > 0, there exist a value of the indirect network externalities
T




The intuition behind Proposition 14 is simple. When indirect network externalities
are large enough, the merged platforms nd it protable to reduce the price on side 1 so
to attract more consumers on that side. As the number of consumers patronizing either
platform increases, the reservation value of consumers on side 2 increases so that they are
willing to pay a higher price. This pricing strategy is protable only when the lower gains
platforms make from choosing a lower price on side 1 are compensated with the larger
revenue they obtain on side 2. For low value of the indirect network externalities this
strategy is not protable as the increase in the reservation value of consumers on side 2 is
not large enough to oset the forgone revenue on side 1. The parameter  also plays an
important role. It goes in the same direction of the indirect network externalities. Figure
2 shows the dierence between post- and pre-merger prices on side 1 as function of 2.
The dashed line represents the dierence between post- and pre-merger prices when  = 1.
The solid line is price dierence for  = 0:5.
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Figure 4.2: Comparison between pre- and post-merger prices on side 1.
The graph shows that there exists a threshold, T
2 such that for any 2 > T
2 ,
the post-merger price on side 1 after the merger is lower than the one charged in the
pre-merger equilibrium. T
2 is a decreasing function of . The higher , the lower is the
value of the network externalities for which after the merger the platforms charge a lower
price than in the pre-merger equilibrium.
In the range where 2 > T
2 , the price on side 1 is lower than the one charged in the
pre-merger equilibrium. This implies that nM
1 < n
1 as it can be seen from (4.3) and (4.8).
The higher the , the lower the size of the indirect network externalities that induces
the merging platforms to lower the price charged on side 1. As stated above, even for
relatively small values of 2 and , the platforms have incentives to set a lower price on
side 1 so as to attract more consumers on that side of the market.
A larger demand on side 1 would imply a higher gross surplus for side 2 consumers.
This means that the merged platform can set a higher price on that side of the market
and thus get higher revenue on the inframarginal units. Moreover, for the same values of
2 and  there are customers on side 2 (those on the wings that were not patronizing any
platform before the merger) now willing to buy the good even if the price has increased.
Thus, the following result holds
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Proposition 15 There exists a subset of the parameter space dened in Proposition 14,
in which the demand on side 2 increases post-merger equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The existence of a range of values for 2 for which the demand on side 2 increases after
the merger is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 4.3: Comparison between pre- and post-merger quantities on side 2.
Figure 3 shows the dierence between the quantity sold on side 2 by each platform
in the post- and pre-merger equilibrium. The dashed line is drawn for  = 0:5 while the
solid line is drawn for  = 1. In both cases, the dierence is negative for low values of
the network externalities. As 2 increases, the dierence becomes smaller. For 2 > T
2 ,
the quantity sold in the post-merger equilibrium becomes larger than the one sold in the
pre-merger one. The value for T
2 depends on the parameter . The larger , the lower
the threshold is.
The increase in demand on side 2 and the lower price charged on side 1 imply an
increase in consumers' surplus. The consumers' welfare is computed as in the pre-merger
equilibrium. It is given by the sum of (4.6) and (4.7). The only dierence with the
pre-merger case is that now the marginal consumers on the wings z and w are dierent.
Figure 4 shows the eect of the merger on consumers' surplus.
It shows how the change in consumers' surplus varies with the parameter measuring
the indirect network externalities for several values of . The relation is positive. For
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Figure 4.4: Comparison between pre- and post-merger consumers' surplus.
low values of 2 the post-merger consumers' surplus is smaller than the pre-merger one,
thus implying that the merger is welfare detrimental. By contrast, when 2 is above the
threshold level CS
2 the merger is pro competitive. As in the other graph, the dotted line
is drawn for  = 0:5 while the solid line for  = 1.
The intuition for this result is simple. When the price on side 1 decreases, two eects
are produced:
 The demand on side 1 increases
 Given the increases in demand, side 2 consumers' gross surplus also increases.
These eects are very signicant after the merger. Unlike in the pre- merger equi-
librium, in choosing the optimal pricing strategy, the merged platforms internalize the
eects that a change in price has on both products on the two sides of the market. This
explains why the merged platforms have a strong incentive to set a lower price (even lower
than in pre-merger situation) on side 1 and simultaneously to set a higher price on side 2.
However, in the interval of values for the externalities and the compatibility parameters
described above, the demand increases also on side 2 meaning that the gross surplus grows
more than the price. Thus, all these forces together produce the increase in consumers'
surplus. As shown in Figure 4, the higher the degree of compatibility, the lower the value
of the network externalities for which the merger is welfare enhancing. The graph also
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shows that  is important for the merger to be welfare enhancing: the higher the value the
consumers on side 2 patronizing platform k attach to the consumers on side 1 patronizing
the platform  k, the lower is the value of the network externalities for which the merger
has a positive eect on consumers' welfare.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper I discussed the eects of mergers in two-sided markets. The main results of
the paper is that the existence of indirect network externalities drives the platforms' pricing
strategy, after the merger, toward a reduction of price, rather than the usual increase that
we observe in one-sided markets due to increased concentration (absent eciency gains).
In two-sided markets, mergers may be welfare enhancing, under some specic conditions.
This results is due to the existence of indirect network externalities: consumers value all
the consumers patronizing the platforms on the other side of the market. The merger
strengthens the incentives for the merged platforms to set a low price on one side of the
market. Charging a low price on one side, platforms can gain from the other side of the
market where more consumers buy the good at a higher price. A lower price on one side
1 attracts more consumers and, thus, it implies an increase in the gross surplus of the
consumers on the other side of the market. For suciently high value of the network
externalities, a lower price on side 1 and higher demand and price on side 2 than in
the pre merger equilibrium are observed. The higher the network externalities, the more
protable this pricing strategy is. Another factor inuencing the welfare eects of the
merger is compatibility. A higher degree of compatibility amplies the positive welfare
eects of the merger. Indeed, ceteris paribus, a higher value of  corresponds to a larger
drop in the post merger price on side 1. Consistently, the eect on the demand on side
2 and thus, on welfare is also larger. The positive welfare eects of the merger, thus,
depend on the size of the externality. When the indirect network externalities are small,
the traditional merger analysis applies: the prices increase on both sides of the market
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and the merger is welfare detrimental.
The analysis proposed in the paper suits media platforms but it can be also extended to
other industries. In a situation in which on both sides of the markets there are positive
indirect network externalities (i.e. credit cards, operating system etc.), this result would
be even stronger. The existence of positive indirect network externalities on both sides
of the market would create an incentive for the platforms to keep the price low after the
merger in order to increase the demand on both sides. This would imply lower revenues
from the infra-marginal units but, at the same time, a larger demand and, overall, higher
prots for the platforms. Thus, this strategy would also be benecial for consumers.
The paper oers relevant policy implications for antitrust authorities. It suggests that
dealing with two-sided platforms, the authorities should apply a particular attention in
examining mergers in such markets. In fact, the criteria and techniques applied in the case
of mergers in the traditional one-sided markets might not apply in the two-sided ones.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 11 Platforms choose simultaneously pk
1 and pk
2 in order to max-









































The equilibrium quantities, n
1 and n




Proof of Proposition 12 First I check that prots and quantities are non negative.
Given S > 0, it can be easily seen that this is the case for any 0 < 2 < 2:10.
In order for the platforms to have overlapping market areas, it must be that in equilibrium,
on both sides of the market, all the consumers in the interval [0;1] patronize one platform.
To prove this, it is enough to show that for the consumers located exactly at 1
2 the gross
surplus from the good is higher than the sum of the price and the transportation costs.
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This must be the case on both sides of the market. Thus, to have overlapping market













Substituting the expression for p
1, into (16) and those for n
1 and p
2 into (17), we obtain
(24 + 102






 72 + 212 + 202





 > 0: (19)
respectively, for side 1 and 2. Given the parametric restriction on  stated above the
denominator is always positive. To prove, thus, that the inequality (18) and (19) hold, it
must be shown that the numerators of either conditions are positive.
I start from the rst inequality (18). Solving the numerator with equality I can nd the
lowest value of S, SMIN
1 , such that for S > SMIN
1 the numerator is positive. The same
reasoning applies to the inequality (19). The two values SMIN
1 and SMIN
2 are given by
SMIN
1 =














2 are decreasing in 2.





2 and when 2 = 0, SMIN
1 = 13
6 . Similarly it can be found
that a sucient condition for the second inequality to hold is S > 0:6. Putting together
all the conditions, the proposition follows. 
Proof of Proposition 14 Pre and post merger prices, p
1 and pM
1 , are both mono-
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Thus, at 2 = 0, pM
1 > p
1. Given that both p
1 and pM
1 are both decreasing in 2, to
show that Texists so that the post-merger price is lower than the pre-merger one, it is
enough to show that the price function in the post merger equilibrium is steeper than the















 (1 + 2S)(1 + )







32 + 24 + 52
2(32   52)
2
For  > 0, solving (22) with equality, it gives T
2 ():
Proof of Proposition 15 After the merger the platforms have overlapping market
areas. This means that all the consumers in the interval [0;1], on both side of the market,
patronize either platform. Thus, if the merger produces an increase in the demand on side
2, it must be the case that more consumers on the wings decide to join a platform. It
must be that
S + 2(1 + )nM
1   pM
2 > S + 2n
1   p
2
The price charged on side 2 after the merger is higher than that in the pre-merger
equilibrium.
Therefore, if an increase in demand is observed on side 2, it is due to an increase in
the gross surplus of consumers located on side 2 that compensate the negative eect of an
increase in price. This means that
S + 2(1 + )nM
1   S + 2n
1 > 0:
Substituting the values for nM
1 and n
1 as dened in Propositions 11 and 13 , the








2)(3   2(1 + ))
: > 0 (23)
For any S > 0, there always exists a combination of 2 and  in the admissible parameter
space such that (23) is greater than zero meaning that, after the merger, the demand on
side 2 increases.
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